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ABSTRACT 
 
THE US POLICY ON THE CYPRUS QUESTION:  
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
Dundar, Murat  
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal 
 
July 2005 
 
This thesis analyzes continuity and change in the US policy on the Cyprus question 
in chronological order, starting from 1950s, when US interest in the island began to 
increase by the beginning of the Cold War, to this day. It mainly puts the 
determinants of US policy in the Cold War and post-Cold War period and tries to 
find continuing and changing aspects of it while looking at its effects on finding a 
solution to the problem. It examines the Annan plan, as the latest and most important 
effort of the international community for the solution, in detail. The thesis aims to 
put forward a general picture of US policy on Cyprus especially focusing on crisis 
periods, and thus explain its role in the evolution of the conflict. The study claims 
that policy of the US on Cyprus has been very much related with its interests in 
Mediterranean, its strategic security needs in the region and neighbouring regions 
and its relations with Turkey and Greece. These determinants indicate that main lines 
of US policy on Cyprus have not changed radically through this almost fifty years 
old conflict although it sometimes showed little variations.  
Keywords: The US policy, Cyprus, Crisis, Conflict, Continuity, Change  
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ÖZET 
 
ABD’NİN KIBRIS MESELESİ POLİTİKASI:  
SÜREKLİLİK VE DEĞİŞİM 
Dundar, Murat  
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Hasan Ünal  
 
Temmuz 2005 
 
Bu tez ABD’nin Kıbrıs meselesine dair politikasındaki süreklilik ve değişimi, Soğuk 
Savaşın başlamasıyla beraber ABD’nin ada üzerindeki çıkarlarının artmaya başladığı 
1950lerden günümüze kadar kronolojik bir düzende incelemektedir.  Tez genel 
olarak Soğuk Savaş ve takip eden dönemde ABD politikasını belirleyen faktörleri 
ortay koymakta ve bir yandan bu politikanın meselenin çözümüne etkilerini 
araştırırken diğer taraftan da bu politikanın süreklilik arz eden ve değişen taraflarını 
bulmaya çalışmaktadır. Annan planı ise uluslararası camianın çözüm için  en son ve 
önemli çabası olması açısından detaylı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Bu tez özellikle kriz 
dönemleri üzerine odaklanarak ABD politikasının genel bir resmini ortaya koymayı, 
ve böylece anlaşmazlığın evrimindeki rolünü ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu 
çalışma ABD’nin Kıbrıs politikasının Akdeniz’deki çıkarları, bölgedeki ve komşu 
bölgelerdeki stratejik güvenlik ihtiyacı ve Türkiye ve Yunanistan ile ilişkileriyle 
yakından ilgili olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu faktörler göstermektedir ki ABD’nin 
Kıbrıs politikası zaman zaman ufak değişiklikler göstermişse de bu politikanın genel 
hatları radikal bir şekilde değişmemiştir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler : ABD politikası, Kıbrıs, Kriz, Anlaşmazlık, Süreklilik, Değişim.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Since Cyprus was a British Crown Colony until the mid-1950s, the US was not 
involved in it before the Cold War. But its strategic interests and the British call for 
help on the Cyprus question played the most important role in involvement of the 
US.   
The Subject of this study was inspired by an interest in presentation of US role and 
influence, as the only Super Power and most influential actor in the international 
community, on the Cyprus question since it was involved in the issue. It will analyze 
continuity and change in the US policy on the Cyprus question. It is arranged in 
chronological order, and latest developments are examined in detail.  Major 
questions to be answered, are as follows: What has been the policy of US on the 
Cyprus question? What have been the determinants of this policy? What has been the 
role/influence of this policy on efforts to find a solution to the problem? What are the 
continuing and changing aspects of US policy on the Cyprus question since it was 
involved in the issue?  
The thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, US policy on Cyprus during 
the Cold War is analyzed. The 1950s was taken as the starting point since US interest 
in the island began in this period. The birth of Cyprus Republic and the following 
events are presented in chronological order, and the role of the US in these events or 
its reactions to them are put forward. Determinants of US policy are examined.  
 2 
The second chapter deals with US policy toward Cyprus in the post-Cold War period 
until the presentation of the Annan plan. The End of Soviet influence and beginning 
of the European Union (EU) and its effect, conflicts between the two sides, as well as 
Turkey and Greece, and continuation of the solution efforts for the Cyprus question 
are important headlines in this period.   
In the third chapter, Annan plan, which was thought as the best chance ever for 
reaching a settlement by the Americans, its referenda and aftermath are analyzed in 
detail. The US role in preparing and presentation of the plan, its will and pressure on 
the two sides to put it on referendum are examined. In the last parts of the chapter, 
reactions of the US, along with the UN and the EU, to the results of the referenda are 
presented.  
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CHAPTER 1: CYPRUS QUESTION AND THE US DURING THE                                 
COLD WAR 
1.1. Introduction  
The US was not involved in Cyprus historically or geopolitically before the Cold 
War, because the island was a British Crown Colony until the mid-1950s. But the 
Cold War formed US strategic interests considerably. The increase of US concern 
with Cyprus was very much related with the containment strategy of the Americans. 
This strategy was intended to prevent the spread of communism, especially in 
regions, strategically critical for the US.1  
This chapter will try to find out the policies of the US during the Cold War years. 
The reason why the US got involved in the Cyprus question and the influential 
factors affecting its policies in this period will be examined.  
First of all, it should be mentioned that the US policy toward Cyprus during the Cold 
War years was based on four main aims that reflected the general extent of US 
interests in Eastern Mediterranean: First, the political stability of the Republic of 
Cyprus should took precedence over all other factors. Therefore, Cyprus would be 
taking sides with the other founding states against communism. Then the island 
should be economically developed and democratic to pursue pro-Western policies. 
                                                 
1 John Lewis Gaddis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy, New York: Oxford University Pres, 1982. quoted in Aylin Güney. “The USA’s Role 
in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 1, 
March 2004, p.28  
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Third, the US must be able to continue using its communication facilities in Cyprus. 
Lastly, the British bases should be used by any Western nation for any friendly 
Western aim.2  
1.2. American Policy in the 1950s and 1960s 
In the 1950-1960 period the US was a passive onlooker about the Cyprus issue. For 
Cyprus was still under Britain’s sphere of influence and it was a British problem. 
Main concern of the US was to prevent a crisis that might arise between Greece, 
Turkey and Britain over Cyprus. For the US, the type of the solution was not so 
important as long as it was accepted by all three countries. In order to prevent 
weakening of the southern flank of NATO, the US neither objected to ENOSIS nor 
“taksim”, partition of the island. The Americans were against the Cyprus issue to be 
brought to the UN because the Soviet Union might get involved in the problem there. 
It, therefore, stood on behalf of Britain against Greece’s efforts to bring the issue to 
the UN between 1954 and 1958.3  
The US closely watched ethnic violence and the terrorist activities of EOKA, 
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters in 1950s but it did not play an active role 
as Britain mediated in the conflicts and in the establishment of Republic of Cyprus in 
1959 and 1960.4 The US did not take initiatives and did not play an important role 
until the 1963 crisis in Cyprus.5  
                                                 
2 T. W. Adams and J. Alvin Cottrell. Cyprus Between East and West, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 1968, p.56 
3 Suha Bölükbaşı. The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus, 
Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of 
Virginia, 1988, pp.37-38 
4 Ioannis D Stefanidis. Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the 
Cyprus Problem. London: Hurst, 1999, p.199 
5 Aylin Güney. “The USA’s Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?”, 
Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2004, p.29  
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1.3. The Birth of Cyprus Republic  
Based on the policies of the US in 1950s about Cyprus, it welcomed the Zurich-
London settlement and the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus. According to the 
US statesmen a big problem had been solved which could have harmed the relations 
between three NATO allies, and which might be dangerous for the security of the 
southeastern flank of NATO.6  
1.4. 1963-1964: Beginning of Inter-communal Clashes and the First Serious 
American Involvement in the Cyprus Question  
1.4.1. Importance of Cyprus for the US  
When the first inter-communal violence broke out in Cyprus in December 1963, the 
US endeavoured to contain the conflict and prevent it from turning into a bigger war 
between the two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, which could in turn involve 
enemy powers such as the Soviet Union. According to the Americans, a war between 
the two countries should be prevented at all cost because the US was the leader of the 
Western camp, and that a war of that kind would inflict grave damages on US 
interests. Turkey and Greece were strategically located. They were the gates of the 
Soviet Union to the warm waters. There were American bases in this region, which 
were very important for the interests of the US and the West. If one of the two 
countries left the alliance because of the Cyprus problem, this would cause a great 
security problem. Main dangers for the American interests were as follows: 1- 
                                                 
6 Van Coufoudakis.  “US Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question”, Cyprus Reviewed: A Seminar on 
the Cyprus Problem (ed.),  Michael A. Attalides, Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977,  p.108 
 6 
Southeastern flank of NATO could collapse. 2- Political, military and economic 
cooperation with these countries could be undermined which could cause the closing 
of American bases and facilities in these countries. 3- The Soviet Union might get a 
chance to destroy or destabilize southeastern flank of NATO. 4- Even if NATO was 
not damaged physically, the prestige of the Alliance could be harmed.7 Another 
opinion of the American officials was that the problem should not be 
internationalized and the UN should not be involved. For these reasons, on 23 
December 1963, the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, warned all three sides to stop 
the fighting and not to use Military Assistance Program (MAP) weapons.8 But, on 
the other hand, the US did not condemn or criticize the flights of the Turkish jets 
over the island on 25 December 1963 although it warned Turkey not to intervene 
unilaterally.9  
Cyprus had a great strategic importance for the US. First of all, it was strategically 
located at the crossroads of the three continents. It is 44 miles south of Turkey, 64 
miles west of Syria, 130 miles northwest of Iraq and 240 miles north of Egypt and 
Suez Canal. Cyprus controlled the opening of the pipelines on the coasts of Syria, 
Lebanon, Israel, Egypt and the northern entrance of the Suez Canal and the line of 
containment of the Soviet Union along its southern borders. In 1960s the 
developments made Cyprus more valuable for the US. These were Arab-Israel crises, 
the growth of the Soviet influence in Arab countries and the Soviet fleet in the 
region, American concern in Middle Eastern oil supplies and protection of oil 
                                                 
7 Nasuh Uslu. The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American 
Relations 1959-2003, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.70 
8 Suha Bölükbaşı. The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus, 
Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of 
Virginia, 1988, pp.58 
9 George S. Harris. Troubled Alliance; Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 
Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972,  p.108 
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shipping routes, the importance of the Suez Canal and the loss of American bases in 
the area.10 
There were already two British bases in Cyprus, Dhekelia and Akrotiri. Britain could 
use them for military or other purposes. The US could also use these facilities as an 
ally and NATO member. Especially Akrotiri was an important Royal Air Force 
(RAF) base, which could be used for operations in the Middle East and, if needed, in 
the Soviet Union. In fact Makarios had already authorized CIA to use this base for 
U-2 spy plane operations, to set up radio monitors in Cyprus to eavesdrop on 
communication between Middle East and Warsaw pact countries and to install secret 
antennas for its electronic intelligence network. Thus the US already had 
communication facilities of radio listening and broadcasting stations and the horizon 
radar installations for the detection of Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 
launches in the Soviet Union.11 This strategic importance of Cyprus was also a 
motive for the US officials on their policies of not letting Cyprus fall into enemy 
hands. According to them the island should be in NATO hands at whatever cost.  
1.4.2. American Involvement 
During the 1963-1964 crisis the US did not want the Greek Cypriots to bypass the 
1959 Zurich-London treaties by involving the UN in the Cyprus question and 
through the right of self-determination. In December 1963 clashes, the US was 
                                                 
10 Van Coufoudakis. “US Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question”, Cyprus Reviewed: A Seminar on 
the Cyprus Problem (ed.),  Michael A. Attalides, Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977, p.109 
11 Michael A. Attalides. Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1979, p.13 
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worried about the situation on the island, but it did not want to get involved. It 
preferred the problem to be solved by Britain and the guarantor powers.12 
On 25 January 1964, while the London Conference, which was convened to find a 
solution to the violence in Cyprus, was continuing, British government sought help 
from the US for a NATO Peace Keeping Force plan for Cyprus. The British 
government could not bear the Cyprus burden alone any more and if the Americans 
did not get involved in the Cyprus issue Britain would bring the issue to the UN, 
which might affect negatively US interests in the region. In American Under-
Secretary of State, George Ball’s, words, ‘Cyprus was merely one more step in 
Britain’s painful shedding of Empire, and London had no longer the will or the 
resources to preside over such a quarrel’.13  
The US was not pleased with the possibility of involvement in the Cyprus question. 
But it was clear that if further steps were not taken, Turkey would intervene as a 
guarantor power and this would increase tension, endanger stability and in the end 
threaten US interests in the region. Thus the US had to get involved in the Cyprus 
question. As a result, the British stitched to gather a plan with American support on 
31 January 1964.14 This plan proposed that the problem would be solved within 
NATO. It was accepted by Turkey and Greece on 1 February 1964 but, Makarios 
rejected it on 4 February, so the London conference brought no results.15 
                                                 
12 Suha Bölükbaşı. The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus, 
Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of 
Virginia, 1988, p.61 
13 George Ball. The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs, New York, London: W.W. Norton, 1982, 
p.340 
14 Suha Bölükbaşı. The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish- American Relations and Cyprus, 
Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse No.15, Lanham: UP of 
Virginia, 1988, pp.63-64 
15 ibid, p.64 
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Although the Greek Cypriots rejected the NATO plan, the US was still eager to 
implement it. On 9 February George Ball was sent to Athens, Nicosia and Ankara to 
persuade them accept the plan. But Ball’s shuttle diplomacy was not enough to make 
Greek Cypriot side to accept the NATO plan. According to Makarios, the issue 
should go to the UN and the solution should be found within the framework of the 
UN.16  
In the Cold War atmosphere it is important to mention the Soviet approach to the 
Cyprus question, because the two Super Powers were affected by each other’s 
policies on every issue through these years. From the beginning of the crisis, the 
Soviet Union supported independence and non-alignment of the Cyprus republic. It 
objected to NATO involvement and supported Makarios in bringing the issue to the 
UN. Hence, it condemned the London Conference on 30 July 1964 and offered the 
disclosure of the NATO plan. Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, sent messages to 
the UN Security Council members and Turkey, Greece and Cyprus as a warning.17 
The US president, Johnson, replied by explaining that their policy of Cyprus was to 
restore peace on the island, not to make the problem more complex. Johnson wished 
the Soviets to avoid any action that would aggravate the situation in Eastern 
Mediterranean.18 The Soviet Union announced in August 1964 that it would help 
Cyprus in case of a Turkish invasion and it promised for military equipment aid to 
Cyprus in September.19  
                                                 
16 George Ball. The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs, New York, London: W.W. Norton, 1982, 
pp.340-341 
17 Michael A. Attalides. Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1979, p.141 
18 T. W. Adams and J. Alvin Cottrell. Cyprus Between East and West, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 1968, p.35 
19 Michael A. Attalides. Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics, New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1979, p.141 
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After the NATO plan was rejected by Makarios, Britain made a request to the UN on 
15 February 1964 for the discussion of Cyprus, a request to be immediately followed 
by. The session began on 18 February 1964 and ended on 4 March 1964.20 In spite of 
all US efforts for not bringing the Cyprus question to the UN, it was inevitable. The 
US tried to pass a neutral resolution to make both sides happy. To that end, US 
officials proposed a draft resolution with the British. According to the Greeks, this 
draft Anglo-American resolution was supporting the Turkish side.21  
On 4 March 1964 the UN Security Council accepted a different resolution, 
Resolution-186 which resolution respected the intervention rights of the guarantor 
powers but called upon all states to refrain from interference in Cyprus. It required a 
UN peace force to the island as quickly as possible.22 It was a success for the US, 
because both sides were happy and the Soviets were kept out as far as possible. 
According to American officials UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) suited American 
interests on the island which was the restoration of peace and stability. In addition, 
there were no Eastern Bloc nations in the UNFICYP. But the appointment of a 
mediator did not satisfy the US and it sought for new initiatives in the following 
months.23 The UN Secretary General U Thant appointed Sakari Tuomija as the UN 
mediator for Cyprus on 24 March 1964. UNFICYP became operational on 27 March 
1964 and reached its planned level of 7.000 men in May 1964.24  
                                                 
20 Nasuh Uslu. The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American 
Relations 1959-2003, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, pp.36-37 
21 Dimitri S. Bitsios. Cyprus: the Vulnerable Republic, Thessalonica, Greece: Institute for Balkan 
Studies, 1975, pp.141-146 
22 Full text of the UN Security Council resolution-186 available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/AnaKonular/Kıbrıs 
23 Ellen B. Laipson.  “Cyprus: A Quarter Century of US Diplomacy”, Cyprus in Transition 1960-
1985(ed.), John T. Koumoulides, London: Trigraph, 1986, pp.60-61 
24 Robert Stephens. Cyprus: a Place of Arms, London: Pall Mall Press, 1966, p.191 
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The 4 March resolution, Resolution-186, was accepted by both sides. According to 
the Greek side, it prevented the Turkish intervention and recognized the legality of 
the government of Cyprus and not mention the Zurich-London treaties. For the 
Turkish side it did not end Turkey’s intervention rights, restored peace and stability 
and put an end to the killings of Turkish Cypriots.25 But the term “Government of 
Cyprus”, which was used in the Resolution-186 would be one of the main sources of 
argument between the two sides in future. Besides, the issue was internationalized 
for the first time and this was an important turning point for the Cyprus issue, 
because the Soviet Union could involve itself in the issue indirectly through its role 
in the UN Security Council.26 
In May 1964, American President, Johnson, sent Senator J. William Fulbright to 
London, Ankara and Athens to find out the views of the parties. The US tried to give 
the impression that this initiative was not to propose a solution but that it was just an 
effort to prevent a war. But Fulbright proposed that Turkish Cypriots be transferred 
from Cyprus to Anatolia, and this was rejected by Turkey.27  
1.5. Continuation of Violence in Cyprus and the Johnson Letter 
Turkish government decided to intervene in Cyprus and told the American 
ambassador to Turkey of its intention on 4 June 1964. It was because of the fact that 
although there were American assurances and UN force in Cyprus there were still 
attacks and violence against the Turkish Cypriots in April and May 1964. Turkish 
                                                 
25 Dimitri S. Bitsios. Cyprus: the Vulnerable Republic, Thessalonica, Greece: Institute for Balkan 
Studies, 1975, pp.155-156 
26 Aylin Güney. “The USA’s Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?”, 
Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2004, p.31 
27 Nasuh Uslu. The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American 
Relations 1959-2003, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.41 
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government wanted to take control of one part of the island and then start 
negotiations.28  
American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, Harlan Cleveland and Joseph Sisco 
prepared a letter to be sent by the American president Johnson to the Turkish Prime 
Minister in order to stop Turkish intervention. According to Ball, this letter was the 
“most brutal diplomatic note” he had ever seen.  On 5 June 1964 it was signed and 
sent to İnönü.29 Main points of the letter were as follows: the grave concerns of the 
US President and the need to consult with the US government before such an action, 
bad results of such an action such as the partition of the island and a  war between 
two NATO allies, namely Greece and Turkey. Furthermore Johnson wrote “I hope 
you will understand that your allies have not had a chance to consider whether they 
have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step 
which results in Soviet intervention without full consent and understanding of its 
NATO allies.” Another point was that the US did not permit Turkey to use the 
weapons and equipment that had been given Turkey as military assistance.30 The 
letter was a real shock for Turkish officials. 
Johnson Letter is one of the most important incidents of Turkish – US relations on 
Cyprus question that affected deeply the relations between the two countries. The 
Turks expected an opposition but the tone of the warning was really brutal. The value 
of the alliance started to be questioned in Ankara. And for the first time they felt like 
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a satellite country. It was unacceptable for them that the US used the alliance as a 
threat to them. According to Stearns, it was a mistake on the part of the Americans.31  
1.5.1. Why did the Americans Send Such a Letter to Turkey? 
As far as the US was concerned, the violence should be stopped and any action to 
flame the violence should be prevented. For this reason, it put pressure on both 
Turkey and Greece and supported UNFICYP. According to the US officials, the 
problem should be solved in diplomatic ways with limited internationalization. They 
did not wish the problem of Western states to be argued in international forums.32 
The Americans were not eager to put forward a plan for solution because this might 
hurt one side or the other. They wished Turkey and Greece to find a solution through 
bilateral talks. At the beginning, an independent Cyprus did not seem appropriate for 
US interests because this might attract the Soviet Union or could cause a war 
between Greece and Turkey. In the end, they reformulated the ENOSIS plan with 
some concessions to Turkey, namely the Acheson Plan. By this way the island would 
be put under NATO control. But then, when it was understood that this plan would 
not work, they began to favor the independence of Cyprus as long as NATO alliance 
was not damaged.33 
Another concern of the US officials was the impact of communism on the 
Mediterranean region. The Soviet Union had already acquired enormous influence in 
the Middle East and had good relations with non-aligned Arab countries, which were 
all anti-Western. If Cyprus fell into Soviet hands, Western interests in the 
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Mediterranean and the Middle East could be totally damaged. The Americans were 
already on alert because of the policies of Makarios. He was in good relations with 
the Soviet Union and had trade agreements and contacts to buy Soviet weapons. The 
Cyprus government had a non-aligned policy and had close contacts with non-
aligned countries. It rejected Western solutions for the Cyprus problem and the 
communists began to play a great political role in the country.34  
AKEL, the communist party of Cyprus, was a strong factor in Cyprus politics. It was 
a danger for the US and the West. If AKEL took political control of the island, the 
American and British military presence on the island would be in danger. Moreover, 
AKEL might permit the Soviet fleet to use Cyprus ports, which would be a disaster 
for the US. Therefore, the US officials preferred a solution without Makarios and 
AKEL.35  
To execute this policy, the US tried to prevent Turkish intervention in the island but 
the fact that it could not control the Greek Cypriot government entirely complicated 
this policy. At this stage, the US used all its influence to make sure that Turkey 
would be kept away to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey. For this aim, it 
they even used undiplomatic, threatening Johnson letter, although the US officials 
always said that they did not prevent Turkey from intervention, they simply warned 
it about the dangerous results of a war.36  
According to American officials, Johnson letter was intended to stop the Turks from 
a landing on the island. It, therefore, had to be effective, because it was intended to 
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shock the Turks. But one thing they did not predict was the response of Turkey. 
Although the Americans managed to prevent the landing, the Turkish-American 
relations took a sharp turn for the worse. The US administration might think that as a 
small country Turkey would obey their orders. But one thing they did not calculate 
was the pride of the Turks. They later realized that they might alienate the Turks and 
lose their alliance, which was important for the US interests, and from then on, they 
acted more carefully with regard Turkey.37  
Especially, Turkey’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block 
countries and the Third World after Johnson letter created doubts that it might 
improve relations with the Warsaw Pact, and that it might even be affected by the 
Soviet Union. These concerns caused the US officials to be more careful with regard 
Turkey, and they began to re-cultivate Turkish friendship.38 
To that end, the American administration issued statements about the protection of 
Turkey in case of an enemy attack and offered more assistance. They did not object 
to Turkey when it rejected the mediation of Galo Plaza as the UN mediator of 
Cyprus.39 In December 1965, when the UN General Assembly resolution about the 
independence of Cyprus passed, the US was one of the 6 countries with Turkey, 
which voted against the resolution.40 
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1.5.2. Aftermath of the Johnson Letter and the Geneva Talks 
İnönü and Papandreou visited Washington one after another in June 1964.  
Papandreou rejected direct talks, instead he accepted indirect talks in Geneva with 
the mediation of Sakari Tuomioja, UN mediator for Cyprus. Dean Acheson, former 
American Secretary of State, would be there for the talks, too. 41 
The Geneva talks began on 8 July 1964 under the chairmanship of Sakari Tuomoja 
between Greek and Turkish officials. No Cypriots had been called, and on 14 July 
1964 Acheson submitted American proposals. First phase of the Geneva talks ended 
with no solution on 6 August 1964 due to the Greek Cypriot attacks in Cyprus.42 
Turkish side accepted the first Acheson plan as negotiable but the Greek side did 
not.43 In the second phase, beginning on 15 August 1964, Acheson brought a 
modified version of the first plan and this plan was rejected by both sides. The 
Geneva talks ended with no solution on 31 August 1964.44 
According to the American officials, especially Acheson, the Greek side, mostly 
Makarios was responsible for the failure of the Geneva talks. According to him, 
NATO, Turkey and Greece lost, and Makarios and the Russians gained power from 
these developments.45 
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1.6. American Policy in the 1965-1967 Period 
According to some authors, American intelligence services worked to bring about the 
downfall of İnönü government and ensure that the Justice Party and Demirel come to 
power in 1965 in Turkey. According to them, rightist Justice Party could listen to US 
advice more closely.46 There are similar claims about fall of the Papandreou 
government in Greece in the same period.  According to many Greeks, the military 
coup of 21 April 1967 was supported by the US, because the election was close and 
the US did not want Papandreou to win again.47   
1.7. 1967 Cyprus Crisis and the US 
On 15 November 1967 Greek National Guard and police forces, under command of 
General Grivas, attacked Ayios Thedoros (Boğaziçi) and Kophniou (Geçitkale), and 
the UN forces could not stop them.48  On 16 November 1967 Turkish National 
Assembly authorized the government to intervene in Cyprus when necessary.49 
Following this, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel issued an ultimatum-like note to 
Greece on 17 November.50 
The US, again, intensified its efforts to prevent a war. It tried to stop the Turks from 
taking action on the one hand while it pressured Greece to follow Turkish demands 
on the other. American Ambassador, Parker Hart, established close contacts with 
Turkish Foreign Minister, Çağlayangil and told him that the US president Johnson 
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requested Turkey not to intervene but he chose not to send written message because 
of the Turkish public reaction. The Sixth Fleet was meanwhile, deployed close to 
Cyprus and it was, for most of the critics, to deter Turkish forces from launching a 
military operation.51  
Greek government rejected the Turkish demands on 22 November 1967. The same 
day Johnson appointed Cyrus Vance, the former deputy Secretary of Defense, as his 
special envoy to mediate between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus question.52 The 
American stand was that Vance was only a mediator and he did not threaten 
sanctions.  But according to rumors, the military aid of the US to both sides was on 
the table. In Ankara, Vance reminded the Turkish government that the US supplied 
weapons could not be used according to the agreements. In Athens, he said that the 
US might not be willing to stop the Turks from intervening in the island any more.53  
For the Americans, concerns, aims and tactics were the same as in 1964 crisis. The 
only difference was that they acted more carefully not to alienate Turkey. This time it 
forced Greece, not Turkey.  As a result they were successful in preventing the 
Turkish landing without alienating the Turks. But it became obvious that the Turks 
wanted to solve the Cyprus problem in their own way. Because, according to them, 
the US intervention was not effective enough to solve the problem. According to the 
US, Makarios was still seen as an obstacle, and for the solution, he should be 
removed.54  
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The Soviets, too, used the same methods in their intervention in the 1967 crisis. But 
this time, their target was Greece. Athens was forced to comply with Turkish request 
and withdrew from the island a large bulk of Greek forces sneaked into Cyprus 
secretly.55 There were two reasons for that change: After the Johnson letter Turkish 
side developed its relations with the Soviet Union56 and the 1967 coup in Greece was 
backed by the US and the Greek junta was pursuing an anti-communist policy. 
According to the Soviets, this policy of the Greeks would lead the island to double 
ENOSIS, which would cause the island to fall completely in NATO hands.57 
1.8. Events in the 1967-1974 Period and the US 
After 1967 crisis, both sides, Greece and Turkey, were willing to have secret talks to 
find a political solution to the Cyprus question. The US supported the idea but 
nothing came out of these secret negotiations.58 
The US stopped its diplomatic efforts to find a solution for Cyprus question after 
1967. The negotiations between Turkish and Greek Cypriot representatives, Denktaş 
and Klerides seemed to suit American interests because there was a relative calmness 
on the island and international conflict seemed to disappear from the agenda of the 
US. Washington supported inter communal talks, aim of which was to restore 1960 
constitution in a workable way and to protect the Turkish rights.59 As a result, the US 
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started to support independence policies of the Makarios regime. Makarios appeared 
to be ready to work together with the Americans, too. He permitted the US to use 
British bases on Cyprus for its spying flights, intelligence gathering efforts and for 
other communication means.60  
The Americans also favored the Turkish side’s position. During Turkish president 
Cevdet Sunay’s visit to the US in April 1967, Johnson officially supported the “two 
communities” concept of Turkish side. According to this concept, there were two 
equal sides, not a majority and a minority.61 Two presidents agreed on the value of 
the existing treaties. The US was in favor of bilateral talks between Greece and 
Turkey and bi-communal talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. But there was a 
problem: the talks were going nowhere. The US started to put pressure on both sides 
in 1973 to find a solution.62  
Some Greek authors are of the opinion that, the US was still pursuing double 
ENOSIS or the partition policies and supporting the overthrow of Makarios. They 
argue that in June 1971, the US State Department analysts concluded that Greece and 
Turkey were in favor of double-ENOSIS. They thought that Makarios would accept 
double-ENOSIS if he was confronted with something worse. In that case the 
Makarios problem was left to Greece. They suggested that the partition plan should 
be put into operation quickly to face the Soviets with a fait accompli.63 According to 
them, the US decided to solve the problem permanently at any price and the most 
favorable solution was the partition of the island. This would provide the island to be 
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in NATO hands. As a result, the US could use it for strategic and military purposes. 
Another advantage would be that the two allies in NATO, Greece and Turkey, would 
solve their problem in peaceful means. The main obstacle for this plan was Makarios. 
He should be removed from power or at least weakened.64   
Greek authors argue that the US and Greek junta together with pro-ENOSIS 
elements in Cyprus were in preparation to overthrow Makarios and destroy the 
independence of Cyprus. According to them, American intelligence services were 
very active in Cyprus, and they even supported terrorist activities. After an 
assassination attempt at Makarios in 1970, most of the authorities condemned US 
intelligence for planning it or doing nothing although it had known the plan.65  
In this period, the Greek junta was isolated in international arena and it needed 
American support to survive. Therefore, it was open to pressure from the US, who 
used this and put more pressure on Greece than on Turkey to accept double-ENOSIS 
or partition plans.66 
1.9. 1974 Military Coup, Turkish Intervention in Cyprus and the US 
1.9.1. The Coup 
Greek authors maintain that the US had already known all about the coup. The CIA 
had close contacts with Greek intelligence and knew what was going on in Athens. 
Makarios himself publicized that a coup against him was in the making.67 It is argued 
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that the US could prevent the coup if it took strong action against the Greek junta. 
Neither Kissinger nor Sisco took initiative to stop it although they had enough 
evidence. Kissinger denied that his department had any prior knowledge about it.68 
According to Uslu, the American rulers continued their policy to leave Makarios 
issue to Greeks. They did not want to get involved in their disagreements in spite of 
enough warning about the coup. They did not want to alienate Greek side because of 
the American interests in Greece.69  
On 15 July, Greek Cypriot National Guard and units of EOKA-B, led by Greek 
officers, attacked presidential palace with heavy weapons. It was believed that the 
coup was planned and supported by the Greek junta leader Ioannides. Greek regime 
replaced Makarios with Nikos Sampson.70 
The US administration did not condemn the coup and nor did it criticize Athens junta 
for its involvement in it. It did not call for the withdrawal of Greek officers who led 
the coup. In the first few days the US seemed to follow a wait and see policy. 
Although it expressed its opposition to the violence in Cyprus, it did not criticize 
Athens. The Americans did not even openly say that it was the Athens junta who 
organized the coup. According to them, this was an internal affair of Cyprus. It 
seemed that the US welcomed the coup, because Makarios, who was regarded 
untrustworthy for his neutralist and pro-Soviet ideas, was overthrown. A high rank 
US official expressed his inconvenience when he learned about the escape of 
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Makarios from death and Cyprus.71 The US vetoed a UN Security Council draft 
resolution condemning Greece for the role it had played in the coup. In addition, 
American Ambassador to Cyprus, Roger Davies, received the Foreign Minister of 
Sampson regime, Dimis Dimitrou, on 18 July 1974, on the latter’s request. Thus, he 
strengthened suspicions on the US approval for the coup and the US became the only 
state which established official contact with the Sampson regime.72  
American Secretary of State, Kissinger, feared that if the US alienated the Greek 
junta by condemning the Cyprus coup, this might cause the overthrow of the regime 
by new, younger and anti-Western officers. According to the Americans, their air and 
naval bases were needed and nothing should be done to risk them with the present 
and future governments of Cyprus. And Kissinger thought that Makarios was 
politically dead.73  
According to the Turks, the US was on the Greek side and they feared that the US 
would recognize the Sampson regime if they did not intervene quickly. On the other 
hand, the Greeks thought that the American attitude toward the coup worked to the 
advantage of the Turks because this attitude gave the Turks a good pretext for 
military intervention. If the US acted like Britain and the Greek officers were called 
back to Greece, the Turks could be persuaded to abandon their action.74 According to 
Uslu, it is difficult to say that the American attitude was aimed to encourage the 
Turks for the intervention. Because this would bring the results that the US might 
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suffer the loss of Greece and dangers for American interests. In any case the US 
attitude pleased neither side.75  
On 17 July 1974 American under Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco, was sent to the 
crisis zone by Henry Kissinger. His mission was to help the British to start 
negotiation process and delay Turkish intervention. He would shuttle between 
Athens and Ankara trying to find a solution to prevent an armed conflict between 
Greece and Turkey, which would threaten American bases in both countries. 
According to some authors, Sisco’s mission was doomed to failure, because Turkey 
was, at that stage, unstoppable and American attitude toward the coup had been too 
soft according to the Turks.76 But the Turks, according to their view, showed 
goodwill and agreed to wait until the end of Sisco’s mission.77 Consequently Sisco 
was unsuccessful to stop Turkish military intervention. 
1.9.2. First Phase of Turkish Military Intervention 
Turkish military operation started at 5:30 a.m. on 20 July 1974. For the Turkish 
government the reason of the intervention was the coup d’état which had been 
planned by Athens junta and carried out by Greek contingent on the island and 
National Guard led by Greek officers.  
The Americans knew that, if they threatened Turkey, they would lose it completely. 
According to Karpat, alienation of Turkey might cause Turkey to move slightly 
toward the Soviet bloc, which might change the balance of power in the 
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Mediterranean region.78 Kissinger states in his memoirs that the US was in no 
position to support one side against the other in the crisis. Turkish intervention could 
not be stopped without alienating it, and this was impossible.79  
This was the most important example of American administration being helpless to 
influence Turkey to act in a certain way. In fact, the Americans were not against a 
slice of Cyprus territory, a base, for instance, given to Turkey and in the past they 
themselves had offered a controlled ‘invasion’ of a part of the island by Turkey. 
However, this was an uncontrolled ‘invasion’ and might cause a war between Turkey 
and Greece. And the diplomatic efforts were not enough to stop the Turks this time. 
Another point to mention was that the American government was preoccupied with 
the Watergate scandal, and that it was not strong enough to deal with the Turks 
effectively. Moreover, the Turkish landing was likely to bring less damage to US 
interests than alienating the Turks, and the possibility of Greek-Turkish war was 
reduced, because the Greeks were not prepared for a war with Turkey.80   
After the first phase of the Turkish military operation in Cyprus, American policy 
was to avoid actions which would alienate any of the NATO allies. After the coup, 
the US had not condemned the Greek junta and Sampson regime for its interests in 
Greece. After the Turkish intervention, it showed almost the same attitude toward 
Turkey again for its strategic interests in Turkey. In both events, the US chose a kind 
of passive policy.81  
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There was a reality that American administration did not condemn Turkish action 
officially. It seemed that American policy appeared to be in favor of Turkey to 
minimize losses within NATO and preserve American interests. The Greek side had 
already been alienated with the intervention of Turkey, and alienating Turkey might 
cause a total destruction of American interests in the region. The US, therefore, tried 
to pursue a policy aimed at limiting Turkish operation with the hope that the Greek 
side would accept it as a fait accompli.82 Ulman’s view is that the US attempted to 
find a new status for the island that would have a chance of acceptance by all parties 
concerned.83  
According to Kissinger, aim of the US was to keep both states in the alliance. 
Although he was urged by some officials to force Turkey, he was convinced that the 
Greek junta would not last long, and if the US took side of Greece it might pay for it 
in the years to come. He also argued that the Watergate scandal restricted American 
capability.84 
To evaluate the developments correctly, the attitude of the Soviet Union, should be 
mentioned, too. For the Soviet Union main concern was to prevent Cyprus from 
becoming a NATO territory. ENOSIS or partition of the island would lead to that. 
The coup would also bring about the same result, because the next step for the 
Sampson regime would be to declare ENOSIS. For that reason, the Soviet Union 
condemned the coup strongly. It demanded restoration of Makarios regime. The 
Soviet Union directed its accusations at the Greek military regime and its supporters, 
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the US and NATO.85 The Soviet rulers did not condemn but welcomed Turkish 
operation, because, according to them, this would prevent ENOSIS and lead to return 
of Makarios to power.86  
1.9.3. Geneva Conferences  
After the Turkish government agreed to the cease-fire, the first Geneva Conference 
was held between 25 and 30 July 1974 and the second one took place between 8 and 
14 August 1974.87 Toward the end of the second Geneva Conference, the American 
attitude seemed increasingly favoring Turkish position. In fact the last Turkish 
proposal had a lot of inputs from Kissinger. According to some authors, American 
statements might have encouraged the Turks for the second phase of the intervention. 
They seemed to regard Turkish policy as just and fair, and supported Turkey’s 
cantonal proposal.88  
1.9.4. Second Phase of Turkish Military Intervention  
After the second operation started, the first reaction of the US was to declare that it 
would cut off military aid to both parties if Greece and Turkey were to be embroiled 
in a war. This was not a firm stance against Turkish intervention, either.89  
According to the Greek side, the US was biased in favor of Turkey because it 
tolerated Turkish expansion and it seemed to accept bi-regional settlement. Kissinger 
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chose to support Turkey by refusing serious attempts to hold back the Turks, 
furthering their military gains in Cyprus. His statements, right after the operation, of 
not intervening in the Turkish moves increased Greek alienation.90 It should be noted 
that, when the second operation took place, American officials were still pre-
occupied with government crisis and the only thing Kissinger could do was to 
recommend immediate continuation of talks between the parties.91 American 
strategic concerns in Eastern Mediterranean took precedence over the Turkish 
intervention. It did not condemn only one side, but forced both sides to cooperate. As 
it was stated before, it was vital for the American administration not to alienate 
Turkey by condemning its action in Cyprus.92  
The Soviet Union, however, strongly opposed second Turkish operation, unlike its 
attitude toward the first one. Turkey’s federation thesis was not suitable for the 
Soviet Union because this would lead to double–ENOSIS. Decision of Greek 
government to withdraw from military structure of NATO led the Soviet Union to 
soften its attitude toward Greece. On 22 August 1974 the Soviet Union claimed that 
the guarantee agreement was not valid, and that a conference between the all 
interested parties and the UN Security Council members should settle the Cyprus 
question. This proposal was totally against Turkey’s viewpoint.93 
The Greek side was angry about the US because it did not stop Turkey’s second 
intervention. They criticized Kissinger for not blaming Turkish actions. To 
demonstrate their anger, the Greeks announced withdrawal of Greece from the 
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military structure of NATO on 14 August 1974. As a reaction, the US decided to 
discontinue the Sixth Fleet home-porting arrangements in Greece.94 Meanwhile, in a 
large anti-American demonstration in Nicosia, Greek Cypriot guards opened fire on 
American embassy and killed Ambassador Rodger P. Davis and an embassy 
secretary on 19 August 1974. In August and September large demonstrations were 
organized in Greece, Cyprus and the US against the American passiveness toward 
second Turkish intervention.95  
1.10. The Arms Embargo and the Turkish-American Relations 
Turkey’s second military operation which resulted in securing a substantial part of 
the island caused a long battle between the American administration and the 
Congress. The main subject was whether an arms embargo should be imposed on 
Turkey.96  Even before the end of the second operation, a delegation of Greek -
American Congressmen visited Kissinger to request sanctions against Turkey. 
According to them, Kissinger was the one who should be blamed. And according to 
Kissinger, these Congressmen were only instruments of Greek foreign office. He 
could not accept their intervention in foreign issues, but he assured them the US was 
engaged in a very active diplomacy with the Turks.97  
When Kissinger was asked about the legality of the Turkish use of US supplied 
military equipment in its actions in Cyprus, he told that he needed to get legal 
opinion, which he had not done. The next day, on 20 August 1974, he initiated this 
study with a legal team. The team completed the study but it was not made public. 
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However, it was leaked to Senate staffs by the administration. On 3 September, a 
state department official told Senator Thomas Eagalton’s chief foreign policy aide of 
the study. The conclusion was that Turkey’s action could not be regarded as legal.98  
Eagleton hearing this started a battle with the American administration about the 
issue. On 19 September 1974 Kissinger addressed the Senate democratic caucus. He 
wished them not to coerce the administration and the president in this issue. He 
accepted that the Turkish action in August in Cyprus was not legal according to 
1947, 1960 and 1961 agreements with Turkey, but according to him some other 
things, such as continued access of the US bases in Turkey were more important than 
the law and for the American interests in the region.99 If Congress decided to cut off 
aid to Turkey, the US bases in this country would be jeopardized.  
On 19 September 1974 the Senate passed the Eagleton-Stevenson amendment to the 
export- import bank bill. The amendment urged the president to end shipment of US 
arms to Turkey. On 24 September the House of Representatives voted 307 to 90 to 
adopt the Rosenthal-Dupont amendment to the Continuing Appropriations Bill for 
the fiscal year 1975. This amendment favored an arms embargo on US military 
assistance to Turkey until the president certified that substantial progress toward 
agreement was made regarding military forces in Cyprus.100   
On 25 September Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş, condemned the Congress 
decision. On 30 September, the Senate adopted an amendment, which called for an 
embargo on US military assistance to any country that used US arms and aid in 
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contravention of US laws. On 14 October President Ford vetoed the bill including the 
cut-off in American aid to Turkey. On 16 October the Senate passed a new 
amendment permitting the president to continue military assistance to Turkey until 
10 December 1974, if it was determined as useful for a peaceful solution in 
Cyprus.101  
Meanwhile, Turkey accepted the UN General Assembly resolution of 1 November 
1974, which was about the respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of Cyprus and withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Cyprus, and the 
permission for the return of refugees to their homes. On 5 November Turkish 
National Security Council (TNSC) decided for some territorial concessions and 
withdrawal of 5,000 Turkish soldiers from the island. But Prime Minister Ecevit 
resigned due to Mr. Erbakan, coalition partner of Ecevit government, refusal to 
approve concessions. Thus, planned visit of Kissinger to Ankara had to be cancelled. 
The caretaker government of Sadi Irmak came to power, which meant that Turkish 
side could not make any concessions at that moment.102  
As a result, on 18 October 1974, president had to sign the embargo decision, which 
was permitting him to continue military assistance to Turkey until 10 December 
1974.103 On 4 December 1974, the Senate allowed the president to delay the ban of 
military aid to Turkey until 5 February 1975 if Turkey abided the cease-fire 
agreement and did not send more troops to Cyprus.104 Kissinger held talks with 
Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers between 12 and 14 December 1974 and asked 
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them to speed up the solution efforts for Cyprus. The American administration tried 
to change the decision of Congress on the arms embargo but to no avail.105 
On 5 February 1975 the embargo came into effect. This led the Turkish government 
to harden its determination on Cyprus issue rather than making concessions. Turkish 
government announced the same day that it was suspending talks with the Americans 
on agreements relating to the joint defense bases and installations in Turkey. Turkish 
officials stated that this embargo would not change Turkey’s attitude toward Cyprus, 
and Turkey would reconsider its relations with the US and NATO.106 According to 
them, the military aid of the US was not a privilege but a part of mutual 
responsibilities. According to Birand, a Turkish journalist, Turkish Prime Minister, 
Irmak, and Foreign Minister, Esenbel, were against the closure of the US bases, 
because these bases were securing Turkish interests, too. In addition, Kissinger had 
promised that the embargo would not last long.107  
The criticism of Turkish officials sharpened as the embargo began to be 
implemented. On 22 March 1975, Foreign Minister, Esenbel, warned the US that the 
relations between Turkey and the US would be badly affected if the implementation 
of the embargo continued.108 On 10 March 1975 Kissinger was in Ankara to talk to 
Turkish leaders about the Cyprus issue. According to Birand, he wished for some 
territorial concessions to change the decision of arms embargo. On 22 April, this 
time Arthur Hartman, American Under-Secretary of State for European Affairs, 
came to Ankara. He asked Turkish government to work for positive results in inter-
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communal negotiations, which would start in Vienna for the restoration of normal 
relations between Greece and Turkey.109  
On 19 May 1975 the American Senate passed a bill authorizing the president to lift 
the embargo if US security interests were at stake. On 23 May Kissinger held talks 
with Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, and Foreign Minister, İ. Sabri 
Çağlayangil, in Ankara during the CENTO meetings and, again, in Brussels on 30 
May, telling them if they made a concession on Cyprus, the American administration 
would have a better chance to lift the embargo. But Demirel replied that there would 
be no solution before the embargo was lifted. The level of harshness in criticizing the 
American arms embargo decreased as the time passed.110  
Through the end of 1975, American administration tried to persuade the Congress to 
lift the arms embargo completely. Then it turned out to be a partial lift, but even this 
was not accepted on 24 July 1975. The next day Turkish government announced that 
the defense cooperation agreement of 1969 and all other related ones had lost their 
validity. All the American bases in Turkey, except Incirlik, came under control of 
Turkish armed forces. And the Incirlik airbase was to be used for only direct NATO 
purposes. Operations at the intelligence collecting centers at Karamürsel, Sinop, 
Diyarbakır and Belbaşı were deferred.111  
On 2 October 1975 American House of Representatives lift the embargo partially, 
but this move was not enough for Turkey because it did not reconsider the closure of 
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American defense installations in Turkey.112 Turkey and the US signed a new 
defense cooperation agreement, On 26 March 1976, offering $800 million in foreign 
military sales and $200 million in grant over a four-year period. But it was not 
permitted by the Congress and it was never put into operation.113  
The embargo was finally lifted on 26 September 1978 completely. Turkish 
government’s stand against the embargo was not the only reason for the lifting of the 
embargo. There was a change in Iran regime and the US had lost one of its last 
standpoints in the Middle East by the fall of Shah in Iran. Thus Turkey should be 
regained.   After the lifting of the embargo, Turkey announced that the termination of 
the suspension measures was applied to US bases and facilities in Turkey. On 29 
March 1980 Turkey and the US signed a new Defense and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (DECA).114  
In conclusion, the aim of the Congressmen by the embargo could not be attained 
because Turkish government did not change its policies vis-à-vis Cyprus as a result 
of the embargo. Although the two states remained allies within NATO, the arms 
embargo and suspension of functioning of military bases in Turkey represented a 
serious cut off in Turkish-US military relations. The embargo did not produce the 
desired effect from the US point of view, but it reminded the Turks that they were 
heavily dependent on the US for their defense. The Turks showed that they were not 
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merely a straight partner of the US by abolishing the 1969 agreement. But they could 
not save themselves entirely from military dependence on the US.115  
1.11. The US and the Cyprus Question between 1974 and 1983 
After the 1974 events American administration continued to recognize the Greek 
Cypriot government as the only representative of Cyprus. The UN Security Council 
with its all members accepted Turkish Cypriot demands to join the Cypriot 
administration in a partnership project.116 Although the US did not favor the Greek 
Cypriot side openly in the Cyprus issue, Turkey came under heavy American 
criticism and even pressure about the issue. Turkish officials felt the pressure of the 
Turkish public not to give in to American demands in return for the removal of the 
arms embargo. They could not do that because if they did, they would have given the 
feeling that they were moving back under pressure.  
The Cyprus issue became an important one which drew the interest of the whole 
American nation in 1976 American elections. Nixon and Ford had failed to reverse 
the partition of Cyprus, and after that the Democrat Party candidate for presidency, 
Jimmy Carter, stated that a positive approach should be adopted toward the Cyprus 
issue. The interest of American people in the matter led Carter to send former 
Defense Minister, Clark Clifford, to the region to find out the realities of the Cyprus 
question and to make contribution for a peaceful solution, thus prevent the 
weakening of the southern flank of NATO, reducing tension between Turkey and 
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Greece. According to Clifford, the disagreements in the Aegean and Cyprus should 
be dealt with making a defense agreement with Turkey collectively. 
 After the Turkish Peace Operation, Cyprus negotiations really started off in 1977 
under the good offices of UN secretary-General with the inter-communal talks 
between the presidents of both sides, Archbishop Makarios and President Denktaş. 
At the talks, the two leaders agreed on four guidelines to establish an independent, 
bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic.117 After the death of Makarios, the 
representatives of Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Denktaş and Clerides signed a 
document, which demonstrated that they agreed on important basic points in 1977. 
But there was severe reaction of Greek Cypriots to the American initiative in 1978. 
This reaction led the American officials to take a relatively low profile attitude on the 
issue in the following years. Meanwhile, the American Secretary of State, Cyrus 
Vance, met with the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktaş, as the successor 
of Dr. Fazıl Küçük, who had been elected as the vice-president of the Republic of 
Cyprus in 1960. This was an indication that the Americans might extend some kind 
of recognition to the Turkish Cypriot side.118  
The Cyprus question began to lose its position as an issue having the potential to 
affect the American elections of presidency gradually. By the beginning of the 
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Reagan administration, the Cyprus issue was no longer a problem that the president 
of the US would concentrate his/her attention. It was handled by experts and special 
envoys instead of high-level policy makers. For the Reagan administration it was a 
regional problem, not a burning one that would concern American interests seriously. 
In parallel, the US and Soviet representatives did not consider this issue when they 
met to deal with world affairs.119  
The American special envoy for Cyprus was not assigned to the task of mediating for 
Cyprus by President Reagan. But a permanent desk within the State Department was 
created which would deal with the Cyprus issue: ‘Special coordinator for Cyprus’.120 
Some of these special coordinators were Reginal Batholomow, Christian Chapman, 
Richard Hass, James Wilkinson, Nelson Ledsky, Richard Holbrooke and Thomas 
Weston. American opinion on this stage of the Cyprus question opposed initiation of 
impressive plans on the matter. The Americans thought that they should take modest 
actions to normalize the relations between the two communities of the island and 
should focus on the confidence building measures instead.  
1.12. Proclamation of the TRNC 
Although the talks continued until 1983 between the leaders of two communities, no 
solution had been reached. In this period the Greek side tried to internationalize the 
dispute and this was the most important reason for the failure of inter-communal 
talks under the auspices of the UN. The Greek side tried to take advantage of their 
recognition as the Government of Cyprus during the inter-communal talks preferring 
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international propaganda. As a result of this propaganda for internationalization of 
the Cyprus question, the UN and the international community continued to recognize 
the Greek Cypriot side as the legal Government of the Cyprus Republic.121 
On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot side declared the establishment of 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a reaction to the negative altitude of the UN 
towards Turkish Cypriots during the negotiations. The plan of the Turkish side was 
to underline that there were two sovereign and equal communities in Cyprus. 
According to the Turkish side, the only way to find a federation was to reach an 
agreement between two equal communities. 
Proclamation of TRNC, on 15 November 1983, constituted a radical development 
opposing the American attitude of recognizing the Greek side as the official 
representative of Cyprus. Following the Turkish Cypriot declaration of 15 November 
1983, the UN Security Council met on 17 and 18 November and, at the request of the 
Greek Cypriots, adopted Resolution-541. This resolution was adopted by 13 votes in 
favor, 1 against and 1 abstention.122 It considered the Turkish Cypriot declaration as 
“… incompatible with the 1960 treaty…” and “… that the attempt to create a 
‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ was invalid,…” Moreover it called upon all 
states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus.123  
On 11 May 1984, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution-550, confirming the 
Resolution-541, with 13 votes in favor, 1 against (Pakistan) and 1 abstention (this 
time the US). This resolution said that all secessionist actions, including the 
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purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership were illegal and invalid and called for their immediate withdrawal. It 
repeated its earlier call for all the states not to recognize the TRNC.124 The abstention 
vote of the US for this resolution is interesting because although it accepted the 
Resolution-541, by this abstention vote it tried to prevent the problem from getting 
worse by showing Turkey that the atmosphere was not completely against the 
Turkish side.125  
The UN Security Council, meanwhile, supported the Greek Cypriot embargo on the 
TRNC and this embargo has been restraining the development of a tourist industry of 
any size in northern Cyprus by prohibiting direct flights. This has led to the 
comparative poverty of the TRNC economy although it has great economic 
potential.126   The American administration was not pleased with the proclamation of 
TRNC, and it prevented the recognition of it by Muslim countries by warning them 
one by one.127 However, the US did not take forceful measures and continued to 
support inter-communal negotiations for a solution. But prevention of recognition for 
TRNC became one of the basic principles of the American policies about the Cyprus 
issue after this date.128 Meanwhile, one of the actions of the American Congress to 
achieve, at least, the economic reunion of the island, was its appropriation of 250 
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million dollars of aid for the Cyprus Peace and Reconstruction Fund in May 1984.129 
In the following years the apparent war between American Congress and the 
administration on the Cyprus question began to be replaced by the opinion that they 
should cooperate to persuade the parties to the Cyprus problem for a solution.130 
 1.13. Proximity Talks 
After the Turkish Cypriot declaration of the sovereignty, proximity talks were held 
between the two communities with the help of the UN Secretary-General, Perez De 
Cuellar. He offered a draft framework agreement in 1986 after a series of 
discussions. The agreement would provide a federal, bi-communal, bi-zonal 
constitution, in many ways similar to 1960 treaties.  American Secretary of State, 
George Shultz, considered the 1984-1986 proximity talks as the last chance for the 
solution of the Cyprus problem.131 President Reagan sent a letter to Turkish 
President, Kenan Evren, on the issue. He asked the sides to make serious efforts to 
reach a quick solution. According to him, the ultimate aim should be to establish a 
federal republic, which would end the partition of the island.  
The US promised the Turkish administration that it would end its pressures if 
Turkish side accepted the UN written proposals of 17 January 1985 and 29 March 
1986. The Turkish side accepted the document with only one exception, which was 
the clarity of the undefined dates for the implementation of the plan. Then again, the 
TRNC had agreed to a much stronger federation in which the remaining powers were 
kept in the two states. They accepted the federal sovereignty over all the territory of 
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Cyprus and a single citizenship. But, Greek Cypriot government rejected the 
proposed settlement at the last minute. Greek Cypriot President, Kyprianou, 
persuaded by the Greek Government in Athens, put some prerequisites, which were 
the withdrawal of the Turkish forces, the return of all Turkish settlers to Turkey, 
effective international guarantees to change the Treaty of Guarantee and the 
application of the three freedoms.132 Thus, Turkish side gave its approval to these 
proposals. But the American pressures were directed again toward the Turkish side 
although it was the Greek side that rejected the proposals.133 During his visit to 
Washington, TRNC President, Denktaş, met with members of the Congress, but he 
was not accepted by the US State Department.  This treatment alienated Turkish side 
in September 1986.134  
The US avoided giving the slightest impression that they recognized the Turkish 
Cypriot administration. This attitude created a contrast with their earlier approach to 
the Cyprus question in the aftermath of the 1974 events.135 Another point that needs 
to be evaluated about the American policies before 1990 is the efforts of the 
American Congress, with the effects of the Greek lobby, to relate economic aid to 
Turkey to the condition of withdrawal of Turkish forces from the island. This 
approach of the American Congress continued after the end of the Cold War, too.136 
The strategic importance of Cyprus for the US was not changed in this period. The 
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Americans continued their operations and the use of facilities on the island. This 
issue remained as one of the determinants of the US policy.137 
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CHAPTER 2: THE END OF THE COLD WAR: NEW POLICIES                   
AND NEW ACTORS 
2.1. Introduction 
In the beginning of the post-Cold War period the Cyprus problem was still there 
remaining to be solved. In the American and NATO eyes, the Cyprus problem was 
still a matter of conflict between two NATO allies and thus, should be solved as soon 
as possible to avoid the decrease of NATO effectiveness in the new world order.138 
In fact, threat perceptions of the US had been changed by the end of the Cold War, 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc. The US came out the 
only Super Power and thus, the containment strategy of the US was no longer 
pertinent.139 But the Middle East was gaining more importance as a center of crisis, 
for example, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the subsequent Gulf War led by the 
US. This proved that the Mediterranean was still important for US strategic interests 
and the US involvement in the Mediterranean was needed in the post Cold War 
period, too.140 The weakening of the southern flank of NATO could bring much more 
damage than it could in the Cold War period. 
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In the post-Cold War period the US had global as well as regional interests in the 
Mediterranean. Its regional interests were on the Southern Europe and Middle East 
and the global one involved the crisis management. Oil reserves in the region, 
security of Israel, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which the states like 
Iran and Iraq had, were the main concerns of the US in the Middle East.141  
Cyprus, with its strategic location, was still important for the US. As a matter of fact, 
it became more important. According to US officials Cyprus was a partner against 
new global threats, such as proliferation of WMD, international crime, illegal 
narcotics and terror.142 Thus a peaceful solution should be found to the Cyprus 
question. 
In this period the US affirmed that the status quo in Cyprus, based on the partition, 
could not be acceptable and pointed out that inter-communal negotiations should be 
continued without any precondition. It pressurized the two sides to activate inter-
communal talks continuously and put more pressure on the side, which seemed to 
avoid the negotiations. Turkish side was considered as the origin of the difficulties 
because it was firm on the recognition of TRNC and the breaking off of the EU 
membership process of the Greek Cypriots before achieving a complete solution. 
Thus, it was to be pressurized more.143 By the active participation of the EU to the 
Cyprus issue Turkey would come under more pressure because it was not a member 
of the EU and was thought as the guilty side in the problem by the EU.  
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This chapter will try to find out the policies of the US in the post-Cold War period 
until the presentation of the Annan Plan and the effects of the end of the Cold War, 
new world order and the new actors, like the EU, on its policies toward the Cyprus 
question. 
2.2. The Set of Ideas and Other Initiatives in the Early 1990s 
At the end of 1980s, the American administration appointed Nelson Ledsky as the 
special coordinator for Cyprus and American President met with Greek Cypriot 
leader, Vasiliou, in June 1989 in Washington and called on the two communities for 
new negotiations. Ledsky went to Cyprus at the end of 1989 and inter communal 
talks were held at the beginning of 1990. But this initiative did not produce the 
desired result.144 
According to the Turks these new initiatives in American position was to promote 
the candidacy of Cyprus for the EU because the Cyprus problem should be solved in 
order to make Cyprus’ entry into the EU possible. On the other hand, the Americans 
considered Denktaş as the only obstacle to the solution of the Cyprus problem and 
they wanted the Turkish government to pressurize him for a more moderate 
attitude.145  
The inter-communal talks failed in March 1990 but the US wanted to use the positive 
atmosphere created after the Gulf War to solve the problem.146 Turkish President, 
Özal, with American encouragement, proposed a four-partite conference between 
Greece, Turkey and Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on 30 May 1991. But 
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the Greek side wanted a conference with the participation of the permanent members 
of the UN Security Council. This time Turkish side refused it because the real 
intention of the Greek side was to put pressure on Turkey by great powers.147 
2.2.1. Set of Ideas 
Serious initiatives were to be taken on the Cyprus question in 1992 and the inter-
communal talks under auspices of the UN Secretary General, Butrous Butrous Ghali, 
came to an important point with his proclamation of the Set of Ideas. Turkish side 
found 91 articles of the 100-article package acceptable and rejected the remaining 9, 
because they proposed a federal system in which Turkish Cypriots would have no 
sovereignty or self-determination rights. 148   
On the other hand, Greek Cypriots objected to some larger parts of the Set of Ideas, 
such as return of the displaced persons, property, and others on the status of the 
Cyprus during the transitional period, which might delay the accession of Cyprus to 
the EU. But they accepted the Set of Ideas in principle.149 Consequently the talks 
were postponed to be restarted after the elections in Southern Cyprus since the two 
sides could not resolve their differences. But, interestingly, the Turkish side was 
considered as guilty one for the refusal of the package by the US, UN and the 
international community. 
According to the Turkish Cypriot side, the Americans and Ghali, who was under 
American influence, tried to impose an agreement on the Turkish side, which would 
bring the Greek Cypriots to authority on the island and thus, the dark days of the 
period before 1974 would come back. When it failed, the Americans agreed with the 
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Greek side on passing an anti-Turkish resolution, Resolution-789, in the UN Security 
Council.150 
Cyprus question continued to be a frustrating point in Turkish-American relations 
after the failure of the Set of Ideas. The US wanted Turkey to take actions of 
Confidence Building Measures (CBM), such as reducing the number of Turkish 
troops in Cyprus and persuade the Turkish Cypriot leadership to continue the 
solution process. Then again, American officials were very unhappy with the 
persistence of Denktaş in not accepting the UN proposals. In Turkish eyes, the Set of 
Ideas was based on giving territory in return for constitutional rights and according to 
the Americans, it was normal. But the point of the Turkish Cypriots was more 
important basic things, such as recognition of equal status for the two 
communities.151 
The UN, by American initiative, tried to convince the two Cypriot communities to 
assume CBMs following the failure of UN’s Set of Ideas in 1992, too. These CBMs 
were to basically permit the Greek Cypriots to return to Varosha (Maraş) in return 
for the opening of Nicosia (Lefkoşa) International Airport for the use of both sides. 
The opening of the Nicosia (Lefkoşa) Airport was very important for the Turkish 
Cypriots because it could greatly decrease the results of internationally supported 
embargo on the North. The package was accepted by the Turkish side although there 
was some reservation. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots in the end rejected the 
new changes suggested during the negotiations and did not accept to continue the 
negotiations on the CBMs.152 Their fear was that their contribution to the talks might 
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cause some degree of recognition of the North, and that CBMs could remove the 
embargoes on the Turkish Cypriots153 and bring difficulties for the EU membership 
of Cyprus. 
Denktaş proposed a fourteen-point peace plan on 20 January 1995, but the Greek 
side rejected it, although the UN declared that there were some positive points in the 
document.154 On 23 January 1995, American President, Clinton, sent a special 
message to Denktaş in which he supported the establishment of a bi-zonal and bi-
communal federation with two equal political communities in this one state. 
According to him, CBMs was the only way for progress in the solution of the 
problem but there was a reality that the Americans were not pleased with the Turkish 
Cypriot attitude of putting more emphasis on their sovereignty and the right of self-
determination.155 
2.3. The EU as a New Actor in the Dispute 
Greek Cypriot application for the EU membership in the early 1990s constituted an 
important turning point for the Cyprus problem and changed the existing parameters 
on which a solution to the problem was sought. There were two opposite views on 
the influence of it upon the Cyprus problem. There were those who thought that the 
EU membership would have an accelerating and facilitating effect on the solution 
efforts for the Cyprus question156. Conversely, there were those who claimed that EU 
membership would destabilize some characteristics of the Cyprus issue, such as the 
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bi-zonality or bi-communality of the settlement foreseen by UN resolutions, and 
thus, would have a troublesome effect.157 
At the beginning, the US administration was against the transfer of the Greek Cypriot 
application to the EU Commission on 17 September 1990. According to some US 
officials, the Cyprus issue should be solved in accordance with the interests of 
NATO. They also against EU intervention in Cyprus because Turkey opposed it.158 
On the other hand, some other American officials were hoping that it would help 
resolve the problem.159 In fact, from time to time, American position seemed 
conflicting. This can be observed in the statements of Richard Holbrooke.  In 1998, 
he stated that ‘if progress is to be made on Cyprus, both sides must be willing to 
engage in a genuine give-and-take. This is not the current situation, especially in 
regard to two positions taken by the Turkish side.’ But, in the same statement on the 
EU application of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ as represented only by Greek Cypriots, 
according to him, it was clear and no one had disputed that Glafcos Klerides did not 
represent or had control of the people in Northern Cyprus.160  
It was a different view from the EU perspective. Although it was a fact that the 
submission of Greek side’s application was on behalf of the island, the European 
Commission considered the likelihood of the accession of Cyprus to the EU 
positively in 1993. But the Cyprus question should be solved and the division of the 
island should be ended before the accession. According to EU officials, this would 
increase the speed of the negotiation process and finding a solution to the Cyprus 
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problem. However, they changed their view in 1994 Corfu Summit and showed a 
tendency to the idea of accepting Cyprus as an EU member even if a solution was not 
found. This change was the result of Greek threat of veto on the enlargement 
decisions of the EU. Cyprus took a date for the start of the accession negotiations on 
6 March 1995.161 
Turkish side was totally against the Greek membership to the EU because that would 
result in indirect ENOSIS and most of the Turkish principles about the Cyprus issue, 
such as sovereignty, the Turkish guarantee, bi-zonal state, etc. would become 
meaningless. The Turks also thought that this would be used as a tool to keep Turkey 
outside the EU. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot application for the EU membership and 
its backing by the EU was illegal according to Cyprus constitution of 1960 and 
international law. According to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus could not join 
in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever, in which both Turkey 
and Greece are not members.162 And the treaties of 1959-1960 were still valid, since 
its signatories did not amend it.  
But the EU did seem to have a different opinion. It considered the Turkish force in 
Cyprus as occupying one. Thus, Turkey tried to prevent the Greek Cypriot 
application to the EU and started joint agreements with the TRNC in 1995.163 
However, Turkey had to let Greek Cypriots continue membership negotiations in 
return for signing the Customs Union with the EU in March 1995. Greece removed 
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its threat of veto on the Customs Union agreement and, in return, Turkey kept quite 
about the EU decision to schedule the membership negotiations with Cyprus.164  
According to the Americans, the change in the Greek attitude about Turkey’s 
relations with the EU was positive and valuable. The US encouraged the EU to 
include the Turkish Cypriot side into the negotiation process. But the fact was that 
the US recognized the Greek Cypriot side as the only and official representative of 
Cyprus. American Presidential envoy for Cyprus, Richard Holbrooke, tried to 
persuade the Turkish side for the participation of the Turkish Cypriots in the EU 
negotiations. According to him, the two sides should come together and sit on the EU 
table together in spite of conflict.165  
But according to the Turks, this would mean that they were giving up their 
recognition efforts and accept the loss of their basic rights and powers. Meanwhile, 
Turkey and TRNC signed an economic cooperation agreement on 3 January 1997 
and a partnership council agreement on 20 July 1997 in the way of integrating TRNC 
with Turkey. Their view was to carry out the structural cooperation and adaptation 
agreements in retaliation to the EU-Greek Cypriot relations just as the EU and Greek 
Cypriots did. The US warned the Turkish side against these initiatives, for the reason 
that they could harm the solution process of the Cyprus issue, although it had not 
showed any objection to the Greek Cypriot- EU arrangements.166 
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The Greek side had now managed to make the EU part of the Cyprus problem.167 
The plan of the Greek side was to ensure that the Greek Cypriots enter the EU before 
a solution was reached. Thus, the EU would become more active and this would 
force Turkey for a more favorable solution to the Greek side, since Turkey was 
trying to enter the EU.168 The EU council and the UN Security Council hoped that 
the EU membership process would help reach a solution by putting pressure on both 
sides. But the EU should work on the basis which had been achieved by the UN 
Secretary General and should be in close contact with the US.169 According to some 
authors, negotiations challenged the relatively stable division of the island and was 
complicating rather than helping the resolution of the problem.170  
2.4. Holbrooke as a New Hope for Cyprus  
In early 1996, Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, was appointed by President Clinton as his special envoy for Cyprus. 
He tried to apply the Dayton model to Cyprus, too. But, he had to postpone his visit 
to Cyprus because of the Kardak (Imia) crisis between Turkey and Greece. Even 
only this event proved that the Cyprus issue was not merely an ethnic conflict of the 
type he had dealt with in the Balkans. It was more complicated than that and the 
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Dayton model might not work at all. But the Americans believed that new initiatives 
might bring about positive results.171  
After the Kardak crisis, Turkey offered a package solution for all the problems 
between Turkey and Greece. But the killing of a Greek Cypriot, who was trying to 
lower the Turkish flag during the provoked border events in July 1996 in Turkish-
Greek frontier in Cyprus worsened the situation again. The US protested, saying the 
flag was not more important than human life, but that these words fell on deaf ears in 
Turkey.172 
In the second half of 1997, Holbrooke was prepared to intensify his initiatives. But 
he wished to wait for the end of Denktaş-Clerides meeting in Troutbeck on 9-13 July 
1997. It was the first meeting of Cypriot leaders after three years. Meanwhile, the 
visit of Turkish Prime Minister to Cyprus for the anniversary of Turkish military 
intervention of 1974 troubled the Americans. According to them, good relations 
between Greece and Turkey, which was brought about by the Madrid Summit of 
NATO on 8-9 July, should not be harmed.173 Denktaş and Clerides met in 
Switzerland on 11-16 August 1997 and in Nicosia on 26 September 1997, but no 
solution came out. In November, Holbrooke told Denktaş that the Turkish Cypriot 
participation in the EU negotiations would be in Turkey’s interests. On 11 
November, he held a meeting in Ledra Palace, on the Green Line with the leaders of 
two communities but they produced, again, nothing.174  
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In Luxembourg Summit at the end of 1997, the EU decided to start full membership 
negotiations with Greek Cypriots but Turkey was not on the candidate list. The 
Americans opposed this decision because the delicate balance between Greek and 
Turkish side was affected. The continuation of inter-communal talks and seeking for 
a federal solution lost its meaning in Turkish view. After that, the aim of the Turkish 
Cypriots was to receive international recognition and equal and independent status 
before getting at the negotiation table.175 
In early 1998, Holbrooke started a new initiative to reduce tension on the island. He 
proposed a Dayton style conference under the chairmanship of the US. The Turkish 
side put forward three preconditions for the continuation of the negotiations in order 
to balance the Greek Cypriot position, which gained some weight after the 
Luxembourg Summit because of EU membership prospect. This preconditions were 
as follows: Acknowledgement of the northern Cyprus administration as an equal side 
with the administration in the southern Cyprus, withdrawal of the Greek Cypriot 
side’s application for the EU membership and putting an end to the economic 
embargo on the northern Cyprus.176 The Greek side was not keen on a conference 
style negotiation process since it might bring the international recognition of TRNC. 
As a result, this initiative of Holbrooke was killed off although his attitudes seemed 
to favor both sides at different levels. 
According to the Turkish side, Holbrooke was not responsible for the failure of his 
initiatives. EU’s flawed approach in Luxembourg Summit was the main reason for 
the Greek side’s reluctance about the negotiations. Holbrooke had openly said that 
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the southern Cyprus had no authority in the north, namely TRNC. According to 
Denktaş, Holbrooke could speak more openly if he was not attacked by the Greek 
lobby in the US.177 
2.5. S-300 Crisis 
An important incident during Holbrooke’s term was the Greek Cypriot initiative to 
purchase S-300 ground-to-air (anti-aircraft) missiles from Russia. Turkish response 
was swift, declaring that force might be used to remove the missiles if needed. 
Americans did not approve this response but at the same time they were not happy 
with the Greek Cypriot initiative, either. There was a threat to the stability of Eastern 
Mediterranean and the US felt the need to intervene.178 On 6 January 1997, the US 
administration criticized the Greek Cypriots severely for ordering new missiles.179 
Meanwhile, in response, presidents of Turkey and TRNC, Süleyman Demirel and 
Rauf R. Denktaş, signed a joint defense declaration on 20 January 1997, which said 
that the postponement of the deployment of the missiles was meaningless, and that 
any attack on the TRNC would be regarded as an attack on Turkey. In addition, 
Turkey and TRNC would respond in the same way, in case of any activity in 
southern Cyprus. According to Turkey, this was a Greek provocation and its aim was 
to raise tension in the region.180 President Clinton gave assurances to Turkey about 
the missiles during Mesut Yılmaz’s visit to Washington in 1998. American assurance 
was important because Turkey was in a mood of resentment due to the EU’s rebuff in 
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Luxembourg Summit in December 1997 and it felt free in taking action about the S-
300 crisis.181   
The delivery of the missiles was postponed for four months from February to August 
1998. The Americans considered that S-300 missiles initiative was provocative, and 
it complicated the diplomatic efforts for Cyprus. Russia declared that this was only a 
commercial deal, and that their aim was to hold up their weak military industry. But 
it might have other motivations, such as extending its influence in Eastern 
Mediterranean.182 The US thought that the reason for Russia’s sale of the weapons 
was to cause problems for NATO by supporting tensions between Greece and 
Turkey in addition to extending its influence to the Mediterranean. They realized that 
Russia was interested in the region more than it had been during the Cold War years. 
Cyprus was important for Russia in several ways: first, it was a good point for the 
intelligence opportunities in Eastern Mediterranean. Second, Cyprus might be used 
to extend Turkish-Greek tension to the Balkans, thus the expansion of the NATO 
could be hit back by parting the southern flank of NATO. Third, Cyprus was 
important for money laundering purposes for the Russians.183  
In fact, these weapons were effective enough to worry Turks but not enough to 
change the military equation in the region. But this crisis showed that connection of 
Russia by selling weapons to Greek Cypriots was rather disturbing although the Cold 
War was over. American administration used its influence to stop the sale of the 
missiles; it at the same time tried to prevent the frustration of the Greek Cypriots. 
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The crisis ended with Greek side’s decision to install the missiles in Crete instead of 
Cyprus. But the US had to get involved in the Cyprus question more deeply because 
of the rising danger in the Mediterranean.184  
2.6. Developments After the S-300 Crisis  
Crisis following one another and capture of terrorist leader, Öcalan, increased the 
tension in the region in 1998 and at the beginning of 1999. But the earthquakes in 
Turkey and Greece in 1999 and sincere offers of help during these disasters brought 
about a new period of détente in mutual relations. This positive atmosphere created 
new hopes for the solution of the Cyprus problem.185 
Officials of Turkey and Greece persuaded Greek and Turkish Cypriots for proximity 
talks in New York through American encouragement. American diplomats put 
forward proposals, using the UN channel, in this atmosphere. Clerides and Denktaş 
held a five-round of proximity talks between 3 December 1999 and 10 November 
2000 under the mission of good offices of the UN Secretary General without any 
precondition. Both sides showed a firm attitude on their ideas at the beginning. The 
Greek side demanded for unitary sovereignty whereas the Turkish side wished to be 
recognized as an equal partner.186 One week after the start of the first round of the 
negotiations, Helsinki Summit of the EU began and Turkey was granted candidate 
status as Greece removed its veto. This gave an impetus to Cyprus negotiations. 
According to some authors there was another bargain behind the scene with the help 
of Americans, like in 1995 Customs Union agreement. This time Turkey seemed to 
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give unspoken approval to the EU decision that the political settlement of the Cyprus 
problem would not be a precondition for the accession of Cyprus to the EU, in return 
for gaining the candidate status.187 Another comment on this issue was that in 1997-
1999 period, it became obvious that leaving Turkey outside the candidacy status for 
the EU might complicate Cyprus negotiations and this might cause serious crisis 
between Greece and Turkey. Thus, the EU gave Turkey the candidate status, but it 
did not change its attitude toward the Cyprus issue.188  
At the beginning of the fourth round of the five-round proximity talks between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots held between 12 and 16 September 2000, UN Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan, stated that there were politically independent parties on the 
island not representing each other, and that they should constitute a new partnership 
as equal partners.189 These statements pleased the Turkish side, but Greeks reacted 
strongly against them. Negotiations were interrupted after the fifth round of talks on 
10 November 2000. The Nikiforos-Toksotis military exercise of Greek Cypriot side 
held between 17 and 21 October was one of the main indicators of the cooling of of 
the relations between two sides after Annan’s statements in September. This exercise 
was carried out on the basis of the scenarios of attacks on the Turkish side.190  
Change of American administration and elections in the Greek Cypriot side on 27 
May 2001 prolonged the waiting period in the Cyprus negotiations. The new 
American administration seemed not willing to put pressure on the parties to the 
Cyprus question, which would please the Turkish side. But economic crisis in 
                                                 
187 Andreas Theophanous. “Cyprus, the European Union and the Search for a New Constitution”, 
Journal of Southern Europe, Vol.2, No.2, 2000, p.223 
188 Nasuh Uslu. The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American 
Relations 1959-2003, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003, p.192 
189 Dışişleri Güncesi, September, 2000, Ankara, TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, p.135 
190 Dışişleri Güncesi, October, 2000, Ankara, TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, p.197 
 59 
Turkey and TRNC emphasized the possibility that the Turkish side might be open to 
more pressure on Cyprus issue.191 
2.7. Developments in the 2001-2002 Period  
After the failure of the proximity talks, the meetings between Turkish and Greek 
Cypriots stopped for a year, although there were attempts by the UN representative 
to bring the sides together. In the end the US and the EU pressure led the sides to 
return to the negotiations. Turkey was pressurized internally too, because of the 
economic crisis. Denktaş called for face-to-face talks that the third parties would not 
participate. The two leaders, Denktaş and Clerides met in the buffer zone in Cyprus 
on 4 December 2001. The UN Special Adviser for Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, was there 
for only note taking purposes. Denktaş proposed a partnership state, which would be 
founded by two separate existing states in the north and south parts of the island. In 
this proposal he softened his former attitude by strengthening the central government 
authority, as it had been demanded by the Cypriot side before. But the Greek side did 
not accept this proposal, either, because, according to them, this was a trick of the 
Turks for the partition of the island. But, at the end of the meeting, de Soto made a 
statement announcing that the two leaders agreed for direct talks in mid-January 
2002. The negotiations would be held under the auspices of the UN Secretary 
General. There would be no preconditions and all issues would be on the table. 
Besides, the negotiations would continue until a complete settlement was 
achieved.192 
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There were now different factors from the Turkish point of view. There was 
international and domestic pressure for restarting the negotiations, and the economic 
crisis in Turkey hindered Turkey’s and TRNC’s resistance to these pressures. 
Second, the EU would decide on the accession of Cyprus at the end of 2002 and it 
was clear that the accession would be completed probably in 2004. This might be the 
last chance for the Turkish side to reach a solution before the full membership of 
‘Cyprus’ to the EU. Turkish Cypriots could enter the EU with the Greek side, if a 
solution would be reached. And this development could help the accession of 
Turkey, too. In contrast, Greek Cypriot membership to the EU before a solution 
might bring about contradictory results.193 
For the Greek side, on the other hand, the EU membership was almost a done deal, 
and this would bring them a great advantage in their cause in the Cyprus question. 
Inter-communal talks would not cause any trouble. Quite the opposite, it would 
increase their prestige in international arena. It would reduce the likelihood that the 
world powers, such as the US, would oppose Cyprus becoming a member of the EU 
for strategic reasons.194 Direct inter-communal talks, under the auspices of the UN 
Secretary General, began on 16 January 2002, de Soto being present.  
2.8. Effects of the ‘September 11’ Attacks on Cyprus  
It can be said that the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 did not have 
any direct effect on the Cyprus question. But, September 11 attacks brought about a 
new international situation that the entire world should face. In this new era, it was 
very important for the US to maintain the unity of the western powers and to solve 
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the problems for the west in order to struggle against new threats, more powerfully. 
In this context, the Cyprus problem had always the potential to cause a major conflict 
within the west to harm US interests in critical regions such as Eastern 
Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Central Asia. Turkey and Greece were 
important partners for the US and they had vital place in American policies in these 
regions. US authorities believed that it was now high time to remove the Cyprus 
issue from the agenda of Turkey, Greece, the US and the EU as bones of 
contention.195  
Thus, the Americans decided to intensify their efforts to persuade the Greek and 
Turkish authorities in bringing their respective allies in Cyprus to the negotiating 
table, again, and the result was the restart of the negotiations at the end of 2001, as it 
was stated above. Moreover, the Americans’ fight against terrorism and their new 
initiatives, such as the ‘Greater Middle East’ would increase the importance of the 
regions, like the Middle East and the Caucasus, and Cyprus was holding the key 
strategic position for operations in these regions. The period beginning with the 
September 11 would, once more, prove the strategic importance of Cyprus. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ANNAN PLAN 
3.1. Introduction 
Face-to face talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not result in a 
breakthrough agreement, and it became evident that they needed outside help for a 
solution. The UN Secretary General proposed a new plan for the complete settlement 
of the Cyprus issue on 11 November 2002. The package, known as Annan Plan, was 
then revised on 10 December 2002 and 26 February 2003.   
At the beginning Annan’s aim was to finish the procedure of the plan by 12-13 
December 2002. The Copenhagen summit of the EU would be held on that date and 
the membership of Cyprus would be approved in the summit. This time limit for the 
decision on the plan was indicating that there was a degree of clear EU involvement 
in this plan and the Cyprus issue in general.  
The chances for the United States in a resolution were apparent and important.  A 
solution would put an end to an essential disagreement between two NATO allies. It 
would be a win-win for the parties and make a very important impact on peace and 
stability in the region. According to the Americans, certain things were clear: first, 
negotiation and mutual agreement was the only way to resolve the Cyprus problem.  
It could not be imposed from the outside. Second, as long as the problem remained, it 
would get harder to solve it and lack of a solution was costly for both sides. Third, 
there was not a choice for the Cypriots between the Annan Plan and a theoretical new 
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and better one, which had not been prepared. Their choice was between negotiating 
the Annan Plan and no solution for the predictable future.196  
American officials stated that the role of the US and the international community 
should be to give political support and aid to the UN effort and to promote the 
situation on the island that could make easy a settlement, not imposing a one from 
outside. The US had been working on the island to ensure that diplomatic efforts 
succeed.197   
The Annan Plan was prepared with the help of American, British, and the EU 
officials. In fact, the initiatives of restarting the inter-communal negotiations, which 
paved the way to the Annan Plan was mainly an American initiative, and Thomas 
Weston, US special envoy for Cyprus, along with Lord Hannay of Britain and Alvaro 
de Soto, UN Secretary General’s special coordinator for Cyprus, were the main 
architects of the plan. They tried to consider the interests of the all parties in addition 
to theirs while preparing the plan. The Greek and Turkish sides were thought to be 
not involved in the preparation process. But it was later understood that the Greek 
Cypriots became actively involved in the process without the information of the 
Turkish side.198 
It was obvious that those who prepared the plan used EU structures significantly. 
Several European models were talked about such as Belgium and Switzerland in the 
process. Especially the Belgium one was argued mostly. Even, then Turkish Prime 
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Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, said that this model was an acceptable one before the 
presentation of the plan.199   
This chapter will try to find out American policies in the period between the 
presentation of the Annan Plan to the present time, including the role of the US in the 
negotiations of the plan until the referenda and the position of the US before and 
after them. 
3.2. Presentation of the Plan and Developments before the Referenda 
On November 11, 2002, the plan was presented as a comprehensive proposal for 
Cyprus settlement. But the timing of the plan and its deadline for the final answer, 
which was 12 December, was not appropriate although it was a sign of the high EU 
and the UN motivation to solve the Cyprus problem, because first, Turkish Cypriot 
President Denktaş was in hospital for a heart operation and second, the government 
could not be formed in Turkey after the 3 November 2002 general elections. It was 
impossible for the Turkish side to evaluate and decide on such a detailed plan in a 
limited time.200 The timing was important for the Greek side, too, because they were 
under pressure to reach a settlement before the signing of the accession treaty of 
Cyprus to the EU on 12 December 2002 in the Copenhagen summit. But the Greek 
Cypriots were not willing to sign the agreement since the election was close in 
southern Cyprus and the existing government would not want to sign an agreement 
before the elections.  
However, American officials supported the Annan Plan by their statements at all 
levels of negotiations and the referendum procedure. These supportive statements 
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went so far that most of the Turkish authors and politicians started to think that 
Turkey was forced to make the Turkish Cypriots accept the plan immediately. For 
example at the beginning, right after the election victory of AKP on 3 November 
2002, Marc Grossman, American Under Secretary for Political Affairs, stated that 
they hoped to achieve a solution about Cyprus until 12 December.201  Moreover, the 
US Secretary of State, Collin Powell, sent a message to his Turkish counterpart 
Şükrü Sina Gürel, two days before the announcement of the plan and wanted him not 
to say ‘NO’ immediately and the US would support the membership of Turkey to the 
EU. On 14 November Turkish foreign minister Gürel said that Turkey had learned 
that the plan had been given to the Greek side before, and that this created great 
doubts for Turkish side along with the timing and the purposes of the plan.202 
According to Richard Holbrooke, the American administration should convince 
Turkey to put pressure on Denktaş to start the negotiations before the Copenhagen 
summit of the EU.203 
3.2.1. Copenhagen Summit 
Membership of the southern Cyprus to the EU was agreed in December 2002 in the 
Copenhagen summit of the EU though the Cyprus problem had not been resolved. 
The accession treaty would be signed on 16 April 2004 and the southern Cyprus 
would become a full member on 1 May 2004 on behalf of the whole island. In the 
same summit, the EU gave Turkey a conditional date of December 2004, to decide 
the beginning date of the accession talks. The date for the beginning of the accession 
talks would be given if enough progress about the implementation of the reforms was 
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achieved by Turkey.204 This decision led to uneasiness on the Turkish side about the 
EU. As a result, Turkish officials increased their support to the Turkish Cypriots and 
president Denktaş because the Copenhagen Summit decisions had decreased the 
possibility of a solution on the basis of the Annan Plan. Nevertheless, the Turkish 
Cypriots decided to continue negotiations on the Annan Plan. Meanwhile, UN 
Secretary General, Annan, prolonged the time limit for a conclusion until 28 
February 2003. Referenda would be held by both sides on March 30 simultaneously.  
In fact, Thomas Weston and David Hannay were sent to the Copenhagen summit to 
help achieve an agreement and put pressure on parties on behalf of their 
governments. But, nothing came out and negotiations were prolonged until 28 
February 2003.205  
Turkish public opinion was separated into two as pro-plan and pro-Denktaş. Turkish 
government was in favor of the agreement although TNSC and most of the Turkish 
parliamentarians were supporting Denktaş in his view that this plan would bring risks 
to the Turkish Cypriots.206 Greek Cypriots, too, showed their dislike of the plan in 
several opinion polls. Most of the Greek Cypriots did not wish to consider Turkish 
Cypriots as politically equal as the plan somewhat recommended. Presidential 
elections would be held in southern Cyprus on 15 February 2003 and the south was 
waiting for the results of this election.  
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3.2.2. The Hague Meeting 
The efforts of the international community and the US continued during the period 
between the Copenhagen summit and the Hague meeting. The main aim was to 
pressurize Turkey and to persuade Denktaş to accept the Annan Plan. On 6 February 
20003, Thomas Weston came to Ankara and met with foreign ministry officials 
about the Cyprus issue. He made statements about the solution of the Cyprus 
problem until 28 February. He stated that the sides would do their share for a 
solution until 28 February, and that this plan should achieve a solution in the timeline 
of the UN and the EU.207 This visit was important because this was the last step of 
the EU-UN-US pressures on Turkey for a solution. Weston was just one of the 
visitors of Ankara in those days after de Soto, Hannay and the EU Troika. Visitors’ 
aim was to make Ankara accept the plan and persuade Denktaş accordingly. Most 
important carrot for Turkey was the EU membership. If the Cyprus issue was not 
solved, membership of Turkey might be in jeopardy.  
Annan visited Ankara on 23-24 February 2003 with his new version of the plan and 
wanted support for it. Then he went to Athens for the same purpose. Meanwhile, 
Weston, too, visited Ankara on 24 February and notified the Turkish officials of the 
US support for the plan.208 Another interesting event about the American view was 
the passing of Weston and Closson, US Ambassador to Cyprus, to northern Cyprus 
and watching the anti-Denktaş demonstration in Lefkoşa, İnönü Square on 27 
February 2003.209 
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 Richard Boucher, American foreign ministry spokesman, put American 
administration’s attitude as a complete support to Annan in his mission. According to 
the US, putting the plan into referendum was a democratic and constructive way to 
determine the future of the Cypriots. This might be the last chance for the Cypriots to 
go into the EU together and the meetings in the TRNC were the proof of the idea that 
most of the Cypriots wanted this. According to Boucher, the parties should meet in 
the Hague and put the plan on referendum on 30 March 2003.210 
Papadopoulos, who was known as an ex-EOKA leader came to power by the 
February 2003 elections in the south. Annan met with the leaders of both sides, 
Denktaş and Papadopoulos, in March 2003, in Hague.211 His aim was to learn their 
answers whether they would hold the referenda on March 30 on the Annan Plan. 
There were essential objections on basic points from the Turkish side and thus, they 
would not accept the plan in that form. The plan was not completed yet and could be 
risky for them. The Greeks had several objections concerning the security provisions 
and constitutional issues. They needed more time for the referendum. But at the end 
Papadopoulos made a tactical move and said that he would withdraw his objections 
on the plan if the Turkish side did the same thing.212 The necessary changes of the 
Turkish Cypriots were much more essential, thus they could not agree on the 
referendum. Nevertheless, the later developments would make clear the 
unwillingness of Papadopoulos to accept the Annan Plan. However, for the time 
being, it was apparent that the Greek Cypriots could turn the issues to their own 
advantage if Denktaş agreed on the plan because the common state was in their 
hands and that Cyprus was under the steady pressure of the unifying policies of the 
                                                 
210 Bilal Şimşir. AB AKP ve Kıbrıs. ( EU, AKP and Cyprus), İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi ,2003, p.440 
211 “Annan: Kararı Halklarınız Versin”, Radikal, 6 March 2005  
212 “Kıbrıs Kâbusu Başlıyor”, Radikal, 12 March 2005  
 69 
EU. As a result Turkish side, especially Denktaş, was blamed for the failure of the 
talks in the Hague meeting. The UN Security Council accused the Turkish side for its 
negative approach in its resolution about the Hague summit.213  
The United States was "deeply disappointed" with the results of the Hague meeting 
as the State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher stated on 11 March. He said 
that: 
 "The United States has long supported the efforts of the Secretary General of his initiative to 
find a lasting solution to the Cyprus problem…. We find it very regrettable that Mr. Denktaş 
has denied Turkish Cypriots the opportunity to determine their own future and to vote on 
such a fundamental issue….. We think Turkish Cypriots should have gotten the opportunity 
to decide these issues in a referendum… The United States worked very hard on the UN 
proposal,…"214  
US officials thought that there were advantages, not only to the peoples of Cyprus or 
the security of Turkey but also for Turkey's accession to the European Union, of 
reaching an agreement on the Cyprus issue.215  
3.2.3. 1 March 2003 Decision of Turkey and its Impacts 
On 1 March 2003, The Turkish parliament rejected a proposal that would have 
permitted the US to position an invasion force on Turkish soil. This was an important 
turning point in the Turkish-American relations and it was expected to have negative 
effects on the US attitude to the Cyprus issue for the Turkish side. 
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Many Americans reacted furiously in the aftermath of the vote, as though the Turkish 
position was a betrayal or the start of a basic reorientation of Turkey into an anti-
American nation. This concept of betrayal was wrong because Turkey reached its 
decision by means of democratic processes.216 The reality of the issue was that U.S.-
Turkish relations were suffering in the short term from the outcomes of the Iraq War 
prior to this decision. 
Reaction of the US to the 1 March decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
(TGNA), along with all others, was likely to play a role in Turkey’s sensitivity of 
Cyprus and its willingness to push Denktaş to cooperate. If Turkey became more 
isolated, it would be probably less willing or less able to push for a solution on 
Cyprus. Therefore, it was very important for the US not to isolate Turkey, although it 
deeply felt angry at Turkey’s negative response to agree to a northern front.217 The 
Bush administration’s decision to offer Turkey an aid package of US$1 billion on 
Iraq War-related losses symbolically confirmed that Washington was not ready to 
abandon Turkey because of the parliamentary vote of 1 March.218 
Experts argued that, the US should accept the difficulties on Cyprus as short-term 
delays and push the parties to close a final deal with greater enthusiasm. The US role 
in near future of the Cyprus negotiations was critical for four reasons: first, the US 
was the only country that could influence Turkey and this influence was the center of 
the next phase on the Cyprus negotiations because at this stage only Ankara could 
persuade Denktaş to accept an agreement. Second, it could make sure that there was 
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no backtracking on the conditions of the present deal on the table. This was a 
likelihood if the deteriorated bargaining position of the Turkish Cypriots evaluated, 
but this could solidify the resolution of Denktaş, therefore ruin the deal forever. 
Third, the American participation would make sure that the devastating majority of 
Turkish Cypriots who had seen their expectations eroded by the present course did 
not lose confidence and move abroad. Finally, strong US involvement would be 
needed to support the UN Secretary General because the UN was likely to be one of 
the casualties of the Iraq War and, as a result, its ability to forcefully push for a 
Cyprus solution might be seriously prevented.219  
3.2.4. Aftermath of the Hague Meeting and New Initiatives by the Turkish 
Cypriots 
Denktaş started some initiatives after the Hague meeting. His proposal was to open 
Varosha (Maraş) to Greek Cypriot side in return for ending the embargoes imposed 
on Turkish side on the island. Turkish side said that it would lift the measures of July 
2000 about the movement of UNFICYP in the TRNC if the initiatives were agreed. 
Establishment of a bilateral reconciliation committee to develop mutual respect and 
understanding between the two parties was another offer.220 Greek Cypriot side 
rejected these proposals, since, according to them, this was an effort to achieve the 
recognition of the Turkish side.  
On 3 April 2003, the US Secretary of State, Powell, said through his meeting with 
Turkish Prime Minister, Erdoğan, that the Annan Plan should be revised and come to 
the table again for achieving a solution. But, at the same time he was saying that he 
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supported the Turkish proposals for the solution. This created a contradiction 
between his two expressions.221 Meanwhile, the convention on accession of the 
Greek Cypriot side to the European Union was signed during the EU Athens 
Summit, on 16 April 2003. According to the Greeks, they had now achieved 
ENOSIS in the end.222  
3.2.4.1. Opening of the Border Gates by the TRNC 
Although the Greek side did not accept the proposals of Denktaş for rebuilding 
confidence Turkish side continued its initiatives by opening the border between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriot side on 23 April 2003. In fact, this was retaliation of 
Denktaş against the EU agreement signed on 16 April for the accession of southern 
Cyprus to the EU. It was aimed as a step for the de facto recognition of the TRNC.223 
The Greek Cypriot government could not prevent the free passages although the 
Greek Cypriot National Council stated that it did not recognize Turkish Cypriot 
decision.  
After this, Turkish Cypriot government took another step by allowing Greek 
Cypriots to stay at the Turkish hotels for three days. Thereupon, Greek officials 
drafted a law, which would bring two years of imprisonment and a fine to Greek 
Cypriots who stayed at the Turkish hotels. Moreover, the Greek Church made 
statements to discourage people from entering the TRNC.224 In the meantime, Greek 
Cypriot national council decided to start a counter-attack and allowed the Turkish 
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Cypriots to have the right to contribute to the European Parliament elections if they 
signed the document, proving that they were the citizens of the Cyprus Republic.225 
Next move of the Turkish side was the proposal of Denktaş, which offered the 
opening of the Nicosia (Lefkoşa) International Airport for the use of both sides in 
return for the opening of the part of a closed sector of Varosha (Maraş). Turkey 
would open its seaports and airports to the Greek Cypriot vehicles, too, if the 
agreement was achieved.226 But it was, again, refused by the Greek side. According 
to the Greek officials, the talks should be restarted on the basis of the Annan Plan.  
3.2.4.2. New York Talks 
The election in TRNC was a turning point for the Cyprus problem because it was 
considered as a referendum on the Annan Plan. And the result of the election was 
interesting since the votes were divided between the pro-plan parties block, namely 
CTP-BDH, with 48 percent and anti-plan parties block, namely UBP-DP, with 46 
percent. Pro-plan block had been strengthened with considerable support of the EU 
membership propaganda, based on presumed increase in the standards of living and 
the end of economic difficulties that the Turkish Cypriots had been suffering for 
years. 
These results encouraged the Turkish government in Ankara, which was supporting 
the Annan Plan. In fact it had to support the plan, because on 5 November 2003, in 
the European Commission Strategy Report on Turkey’s application, it was affirmed 
that the absence of a settlement on the Cyprus issue could be a serious problem to 
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Turkey’s EU objective.227 According to the EU and the other international actors, 
Turkish Cypriot President, Rauf Denktaş, and Turkey were the obstacles to the 
solution. With the results of the elections and the international pressures, the Turkish 
government had to persuade Denktaş for new talks on the Annan Plan. Turkish Prime 
Minister formally requested UN Secretary General to restart the negotiations 
between the two sides.228 
The UN Secretary-General invited the parties to New York on 10 February 2004 to 
restart the negotiations on the basis of a draft plan. He thought that an agreement 
could be achieved on 13 February to restart negotiations to realize a comprehensive 
settlement throughout separate and simultaneous referenda before 1 May 2004, the 
accession date of the Cyprus to the EU.229 
The Greek Cypriot side wished the Annan Plan to be the basis for the talks, not a 
starting point, in New York. They also wanted the Secretary General to be the only 
person to fill in the gap in the plan if an agreement was not achieved. They 
demanded that the EU should take an active role in the negotiation process with 
Turkey and Greece. Turkish side accepted every demand of the Greek Cypriots 
except the EU’s active role in the process since it would make it a party to the talks 
and this would not be appropriate for the structure of the Annan Plan. On the other 
hand, Turkish officials offered that Turkey and Greece could enter the conversation 
before authorizing Annan to fill in the blanks. This offer was accepted, but Annan 
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had given assurances that the EU would accommodate a settlement and the European 
commission would offer technical assistance.230 
After the discussions on the suggestions, the two sides agreed to work on a fixed 
schedule to reach a solution by 1 May 2004 under pressure of the third sides. The 
parties would try to reach an agreement about the different ideas on the plan until 26 
March 2004, and then Turkey and Greece would come to the stage and try to resolve 
as many problems as possible. As the last step, the UN Secretary General would fill 
in the blanks before the referenda. The plan would then be put into separate referenda 
by both sides on 21 April 2004.231   
The first phase of negotiations between the parties leading to the Annan Plan took 
place in Cyprus. But very little progress if any could be achieved in this phase, 
because of the Greek Cypriot attitude.  Alvaro de Soto was the chairman of the 
negotiations. The negotiations of this phase were held at political and technical level. 
Main point of the political level negotiations was the efforts to agree on the changes 
of the Annan Plan. Two sides could not reach an agreement. Since its EU 
membership was guaranteed the Greek side was in a mood of indifference and it had 
no motivation to reach an agreement.232 
3.2.4.3. Bürgenstock Talks 
The Secretary-General invited the leaders to move to Bürgenstock, Switzerland, for 
the second phase of the talks after it was understood that the sides could not reach a 
complete agreement. Denktaş did not go to Bürgenstock, and the Turkish Cypriot 
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Prime Minister, Mehmet Ali Talat, and the Foreign Minister, Serdar Denktaş, 
negotiated on behalf of Turkish Cypriot side. 233 
The Bürgenstock talks started on 24 March with the participation of Turkey and 
Greece. According to the timetable, the agreement should be reached until 29 March. 
The UN sent the parties a recommended outline for their thoughts and judgments. 
But there was no agreement between the two sides. Annan submitted a revised 
version of his plan to the sides for their consideration.  This new plan was answering 
the Turkish demands about the return of properties, the voting for senate, freedom of 
movement and settlement. At the same time, it included the Greek Cypriot worries 
about the effectiveness and validity of the requirements of the plan.234 
The parties could not reach an agreement on this fourth version of the Annan Plan, 
either. Main objections of the Turkish side were about the arrangements on property 
issue and the securing of the rights given by the Annan Plan after entering the EU by 
derogations. On the Greek side, the important issue was the complete withdrawal of 
the Turkish forces from the island. It was obvious that the two sides could not arrive 
at an agreement. Thus, Annan finalized the plan on 31 March and presented the final 
version to the endorsement of the two sides.235  
The EU Commission was also there at the final phase of negotiations in Bürgenstock 
and the EU assurance concerning the comprehensive settlement was decided upon 
between the parties and the EU Commission. The EU had frequently stated its strong 
inclination for the accession of a reunited Cyprus and its support to the good offices 
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mission of the UN Secretary-General and had made exact assurances to hearten and 
promote such a result.236  
3.3. The US and Cyprus before the Referenda 
The US played a very active role during the negotiations to encourage circumstances 
that would help the UN efforts to a successful conclusion because of its interests in a 
solution and the hopeful window of opportunity it saw.  Its role was to give 
diplomatic support and assistance to the UN efforts and to contribute to conditions on 
the island that would ease a settlement, not imposing one from the outside.237  
Its diplomatic assistance was in the form of regular discussions with the parties, 
Greece, Turkey, the UN and EU, and other governments. US officials tried to 
understand the concerns and priorities of the parties, propose ways they might be 
addressed, and arrange support for such solutions.   They were especially active 
during the critical period between February and April 2004 in supporting 
accommodations of key concerns of both sides so as to advance prospects for the 
outcome they wanted a twin “YES” in the two referenda, by which Cypriots 
themselves would welcome the solution.238 At a pre-donors conference in Brussels in 
April organized by the European Commission, the US promised to donate $400 
million, which was the largest pledge made, to facilitate realization of the UN 
plan.239   
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The US was actively involved in supporting the UN effort for a number of reasons. It   
evaluated that there had been a gathering of forces over the past years producing the 
best chance ever for reaching a settlement.  Because of its interests and the specific 
opportunity it saw, the US committed to helping the UN Secretary General’s Good 
Offices Mission to achieve success. There were four aspects that led to this 
evaluation.  Primarily, there was the aspiration of all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish, 
and Turkey to join the EU.  According to the Americans, Europe was an important 
catalyst for a complete solution in this phase of UN efforts. The EU accession 
process gave a timeline to force the settlement efforts more powerfully.  The vision 
of EU membership provided the UN with a framework of objective motivations for 
all parties in which it could encourage a resolution.240  
This UN effort was different from all past ones with the action-forcing event of 
Cyprus’s EU membership. The EU frequently clarified its desire for accession of a 
reunited Cyprus in April 2004, and mentioned that a resolution would ease Turkey’s 
own membership goals.  Greek Cypriots frequently repeated their wish for a reunited 
Cyprus to join the EU. But regrettably, by the time Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot 
side modified their position on the UN initiative earlier in 2004, the motivations for 
cooperation on the Greek Cypriot side had considerably declined because it had 
already signed the EU Treaty of Accession in 2003.   Both in the April referenda and 
in December 2003 legislative elections, Turkish Cypriots established common 
support for EU membership by means of a settlement.  The UN Secretary General 
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always underlined the support he received from Greece and the Turkish Government 
elected in November 2002, which started a change in policy.241  
The second important element for the Americans, improving the hopes for a 
settlement was the UN proposal called the Annan Plan.  It was put forward in 
November 2002 and negotiated over the past months. The plan was entirely 
encouraged by the UN Security Council in April 2003 as the sole basis for further 
negotiations.  It was the most comprehensive and detailed proposal of its kind, and 
characterized a cautious plan assessing main concerns of both sides.  It offered both a 
proposal for a functioning government and a roadmap to a better future in the EU for 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots. According to the Americans, the Annan plan 
represented a culmination of UN efforts over the years to address key issues dividing 
the parties, such as security, sovereignty, governance, territory, property and so forth 
within the agreed context of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.242  
The third element improving the hopes was the Turkish Cypriot side’s decision in 
April 2003 to relax restrictions across the buffer zone.  That initiative had a 
devastatingly positive influence on the atmosphere of the island.243  No serious 
incidents happened between the two communities although there were millions of 
crossings. The hope of a solution became more real with this huge improvement in 
interaction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots after decades of separation.    
The fourth development that increased the chance of a solution was the exceptional 
political excitement that was seen in northern Cyprus together with the change in the 
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policy of the Turkish Government in Ankara.244 The impetus produced by pro-
solution Turkish Cypriot demonstrations in early 2003, especially calling on the 
officials to support the Annan Plan, was carried from the street into the ballot box in 
December 2003 legislative elections. Pro-solution parties defeated the establishment 
parties that campaigned against the UN peace plan with a slight margin.  This vote 
brought forth new Turkish Cypriot political leadership that supported a solution 
based on negotiating the Annan Plan with the purpose of joining Europe as part of a 
united Cyprus.  During this period, Turkey expanded its new approach that a “non 
solution” was not a solution.  In his January meeting with UN Secretary General 
Annan, Turkish Prime Minister, Erdoğan, expressed Turkey’s new policy on Cyprus, 
supporting a continuation of UN negotiations based on the Annan Plan.245  
Another important reason for the American enthusiasm about the solution and its 
pressure on Turkey and Turkish Cypriots for a ‘YES’ vote came to light by the news 
that the US administration was aiming to upgrade its half-century intelligence 
presence on Cyprus into a full-fledged army base when and if the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots sides agreed on reunification in the referendum. According to strategic 
analysts, the Pentagon might begin by establishing a "bare-bones" military presence 
on Cyprus, following the possible reunification of the country that would facilitate 
US military interventions in the region.246  
There are high stakes in the region for Washington, some of which are the energy 
markets of the Persian Gulf and North Africa, a booming military presence 
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throughout the Caucasus and the ambitious Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. If Cyprus 
changes into an island of stability in the region, it could be the ideal position from 
which to monitor the variable unstable places of international diplomacy. 
If the US could use Cyprus as a logistics base, it would allow the Pentagon more 
flexibility in planning interventions in the Middle East and give it more control over 
the oil-rich regions of the Middle East, North Africa and the Caspian Sea. It would 
allow easier management of regional sea-routes and balance the US presence in 
Djibouti that guards the southern access point to the Suez Canal by establishing a 
presence near the canal's northern exit.  
Moreover, the strategic importance of the Turkish port of Ceyhan, which is situated 
about 70km from the northern tip of Cyprus, will increase over the next years as 
northern Iraqi oil runs through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline begins operating.247 Experts say that there are important oil 
and natural gas reserves found in Cyprus, around Karpaz, and southern Cyprus 
administration works on this subject with the Egyptians.248  The above-mentioned 
reasons prove the importance of Cyprus in the ‘Greater Middle East’ project of the 
Americans. Cyprus has a great importance for the realization of the aims defined in 
this project, both geo-politically and geo-strategically.249   
Another interpretation about the Cyprus issue is that according to some authors, there 
is a war between the EU and the US of the power supremacy in the Middle East and 
the Mediterranean regions and Cyprus is one of the key points to gain domination. 
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The US wants the island for its military strategies while the EU wants it for its 
political and economic projects. Policies of the EU on Syria, which the US tries to 
make unstable, its resistance to the US in invading Iraq and its policies on Palestine, 
which are opposing American-Israeli policies, may be indicators of this power 
struggle between them.250  
3.4. Referenda and Aftermath 
3.4.1. Turkish and Greek Attitudes before the Referenda and the Results 
The parties held the referenda on 24 April. It would be done in both parts of the 
island simultaneously. On the Turkish side, TRNC president Denktaş was against the 
plan for several reasons, and asked people to say ‘NO’.251 But the government was 
supporting it and the common political atmosphere in the TRNC showed that most of 
the people were in favor of the plan with the EU membership carrot dangling 
although it was clear that the plan had many negative points for the Turkish Cypriots. 
The AKP government in Turkey was also in favor of the plan and supported the 
‘YES’ votes during the referendum with its statements.252   
On the Greek side, Greek Cypriot president Papadopoulos was against it.  He started 
a ‘NO’ campaign right after going back to Cyprus from Bürgenstock and stated that 
the final Annan Plan would not satisfy the aspirations of the Greek Cypirot side.253 
Most of the other political parties, including the biggest party AKEL, turned against 
the plan, and they campaigned for the rejection of it.254  They prevented the UN and 
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the EU mediators from making comments to the media. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot 
church threatened the supporters of the plan by saying that they would go to Hell.255  
In this propaganda period for the referenda the US supported the ‘YES’ side and 
wanted the Turkish and Greek government to follow suit.256 On 24 April 2004, 
separate simultaneous referenda were held in TRNC and the Greek Cypriot side. It 
was accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side with 65% of the votes, while 76% of the 
Greek Cypriot people devastatingly rejected the plan.257  
3.4.2. Aftermath of the Referenda 
The Cyprus issue took a new turn and a new state of affairs emerged in the island 
after the referenda of 24 April 2004. The Turkish Cypriots proved their dedication to 
the fundamental European value of compromise by approving the Annan Plan and 
they should be recompensed for that.258 The UN Secretary General, numerous 
international organizations and high-level officials of countries congratulated the 
Turkish Cypriot’s positive vote and they necessitated the instant renovation of their 
direct political, economic, trade and cultural activities internationally without any 
constraint to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.259 
International community deeply regretted the rejection of the UN plan by the Greek 
Cypriots because an exceptional opportunity had been missed and only the Greek 
Cypriot side of the island was able to join the EU. This caused an inconsistency 
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because the Turkish Cypriot side, which accepted the reunification of the Island and 
the EU membership, was left outside the EU, while the Greek Cypriot side, which 
rejected the plan, joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 on behalf of the whole 
Cyprus. It became apparent by the result of the referendum in southern Cyprus that 
the Greek Cypriots assumed that if they had rejected the plan, the international 
community would come back with a better one for them.260 In addition, since 
southern Cyprus was a member of the EU they had the veto power, which they could 
use against Turkey in case they needed it. 
3.4.3. Reactions of the Third Parties  
3.4.3.1. The UN 
Secretary General expressed his disappointment in his Report on his Mission of 
Good Offices in Cyprus, dated 2 June 2004. He stated that “the rejection of such a 
plan by the Greek Cypriot electorate is a major setback. What was rejected was the 
solution itself rather than a mere blueprint.”261  
He requested the Security Council to invite all states to abolish the restrictions and 
embargoes that the TRNC was exposed to. His criticisms on the Greek Cypriots have 
not been appreciated by all UN states in which the Greek Cypriots have been 
lobbying actively. Annan made entirely no compromise to the Turkish Cypriot claim 
for international recognition although he did not seem on the Greek Cypriot side. He 
warned the international community not to follow that path. Furthermore, he read the 
Turkish Cypriot “YES” vote as evidence that the Turkish Cypriots had abandoned all 
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demands to independence.262 The new Turkish Cypriot Government led by Mehmet 
Ali Talat, has also come to a decision not to request for international recognition, 
which was the fundamental aim of Turkish Cypriot policy since 1974. 
3.4.3.2. The EU 
The EU reacted negatively to the Greek Cypriot leadership that did not support a 
plan to which it had given its approval earlier for a while after the referendum.263 The 
EU then started discussing new measures toward the TRNC. These measures 
included opening up a representative office in TRNC, establishing commercial links 
with it and offering aid to the TRNC. This policy of rewarding cooperation by 
revoking the trade embargo and creating contact with the TRNC in Eastern 
Mediterranean might work as a basis of US attitude toward the island.264  
Foreign ministers of the EU said that they were strong-minded to end the isolation of 
the Turkish Cypriot population and made easy the reunification of Cyprus by 
heartening the economic progress of the Turkish Cypriot community. They invited 
the Commission to present offers. Thus, the "Green Line Regulations," accepted on 
29 April 2004 and would be effective on 23 August 2004. These regulations wanted 
Greek Cypriot officials to put an end to the limitations on travel of the EU citizens 
between the south and north parts of Cyprus and permit Turkish Cypriots to export 
more products through southern Cyprus.  
Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004, but EU laws and regulations postponed in the 
north until a settlement. The Commission has been offered to end the isolation of the 
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Turkish Cypriots and to help remove the economic differences between the two 
communities on the island on 4 July 2004. These actions included 259 million Euros 
(US $318 million) in aid for 2004-2006 and permitting direct trade between EU 
countries and the TRNC. The Greek Cypriot response was hostile to these 
proposals.265 It tried to find ways to put conditions on the aid and to postpone direct 
trade, which did not let the TRNC obtain features of a state without international 
recognition. It also argued that they were not necessary owing to the Green Line 
regulations.266  
There were even clues that if this process was not stopped, and if more pressure was 
not applied to the Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots might delay, or even veto, a 
decision by the European Council in December 2004 to accept EU accession 
negotiations for Turkey. The EU pointed out that it would consider measures for the 
Turkish Cypriots after the December decision on Turkey’s accession negotiations to 
avoid this connection.267 As a result, the Greek Cypriots were successful and none of 
the measures to end the isolation of the TRNC has been implemented yet. Moreover, 
the Greek Cypriots can now express their demands from Turkey more easily. Greek 
Cypriot Foreign Minister, Iacovou, claimed, on 12 October 2004, that Turkey should 
recognize the Republic of Cyprus before the EU summit on 16-17 December 2004 in 
which Turkey would be granted a date to begin negotiations for EU accession. He 
also wanted Turkey to lift its prohibition on Greek Cypriot ships in Turkish ports, 
permit Greek Cypriot planes to use international air corridors over Turkey, to 
decrease the number of Turkish settlers and soldiers on Cyprus, and stop vetoing 
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membership of Cyprus in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).268  
3.4.4. The US and Cyprus after the Referenda 
The US officials were disappointed by results of the referendum in southern Cyprus 
and they agreed with UN Secretary General Annan that it characterized another 
missed opportunity to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.269 Weston’s statements 
can be viewed as a part of the American position right after the referenda: Weston 
stated that the attitudes of some Greek Cypriot politicians in the referendum had 
annoyed him. He said that he believed Turkey had done whatever it could for a 
solution, and that Talat's victory in the elections was an essential indicator of the 
Turkish side’s firmness on a solution for the world in general and the Greek 
Cypriots, in particular.270   
The US started some initiatives to relive the restrictions of the Turkish Cypriots. But 
these actions were weak in character and did not improve much, and most of them 
remained only in words. Mr. Talat visited the US in May 2004.  He held talks with 
US Secretary of State Colin Powell as well as other Executive and Legislative 
Branch officials. In an effort to make travel from Cyprus to the US more suitable for 
Turkish Cypriots, owners of northern Cyprus passports qualified for consideration of 
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a visa valid for up to two years.271 While they focused on measures to help the 
Turkish Cypriot community, they would continue to support organizing and funding 
bi-communal programs through UNOPS and other channels.272  
According to the Americans, Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan represented 
an important hindrance and brought to light essential questions about their allegiance 
to a federal solution. Greek Cypriot leaders clarified that by this vote Greek Cypriots 
rejected a particular plan, not the idea of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution 
itself, which has been the agreed basis for over twenty-five years of a UN settlement 
efforts.  That might be true, but many Turkish Cypriots started to question whether 
Greek Cypriots were really ready to share the island with them.273    
The Americans thought that the vote and other polling data explained that much 
work was needed to be done on the Greek Cypriot side to create public support for 
the necessarily sore compromises that a federal solution would require.  The 
commitment of the Greek Cypriots to such a solution needed to be confirmed.  The 
best way to do that, according to the Americans, would be to support the Secretary 
General’s call, which they strongly approved, for the international community to 
move to remove unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the outcome of 
isolating Turkish Cypriots and hindering their development.   
Reducing their isolation will encourage Turkish Cypriots to remain dedicated to a 
resolution and reunification. The US is working to realize the Secretary General’s 
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suggestion.  It is working in parallel with the EU on actions to endorse economic 
improvement of northern Cyprus in order to make easy an ultimate settlement and 
reunification of Cyprus within the EU. But it is clear that diplomatic recognition of 
north Cyprus is not on the agenda.  Despite the common feelings on this island that a 
gain for one side necessarily means a setback for the other, this is not a zero sum 
game.  In contrast, lessening inequalities between the north and south will enhance 
hopes for reunification.  
The Secretary General has made clear that there is no basis for restarting his Good 
Offices Mission as long as the current impasse continues.  The Americans agree with 
this idea. They thought that the hopes for reunification, therefore, lie first and 
foremost in Cypriot hands.274  
After the referenda, Greek Cypriot leader, Papadopoulos stated that the Greek 
Cypriot side wanted to negotiate further changes to the plan,275 but the Turkish 
Cypriot side was opposed to reopening the plan for negotiations after the referendum, 
because a greater part of Turkish Cypriots supported it in their referendum. 
According to the Americans, nevertheless, the Annan plan has not gone away and it 
is hard to anticipate any future solution outside the balance of adjustments it stands 
for.276 They think that maybe their views of a suitable resolution will develop as 
Greek Cypriots get a bigger sense of security due to their EU membership. As far as 
Greek Cypriot worries about security and realization of the plan are the major 
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barriers for the solution, the Americans are ready to work with Security Council 
members to deal with these problems, as recommended by the Secretary General.277  
The US officials think that the contradictory results of the twin referenda highlighted 
the persistent lack of a common attitude on the part of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
 More direct contact between the two sides at a people-to-people level is necessary to 
deflate myths and get rid of labels that hinder building a pledge to a shared future.278 
 3.5. Recent Developments 
The UN Secretary’s request for ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots has not 
yet any significant concrete results, neither in the EU nor in any other international 
actors. The policy of the Greek Cypriots along with their lobbies in Europe and the 
US and their advantageous position in the EU are main reasons for this deadlock.  
The international community seems want to see the UN plan revitalized. This would 
be accepted by temperate elements in the South, including former President Glafcos 
Clerides. In that case much would rely on whether AKEL would remove its support 
from President Papadapoulos but the opinion polls still show very important support 
for him.279 
From the Turkish side’s point of view, foremost changes in the plan would not be 
suitable to the Turkish Cypriot Government. Talat declared that the Annan Plan was 
not renegotiable. It would seem very unlikely they could be accepted without new 
referenda, if only small changes were offered by the Greek Cypriot side, which is 
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very improbable. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots might refuse any adjusted 
version of the Annan Plan, more and more aware that the main Greek Cypriot 
thinking is that the Turkish Cypriots should have only minority status.280  
The international community, even now, usually seems to think that the reunification 
of Cyprus in proportion to the UN Plan is both pleasing and feasible. But, the plan, 
for many Turkish Cypriots does not recognize that the TRNC, and the Greek Cypriot 
state should be the building blocks of the preferred federation. As a result, a two-
state solution would be a less complicated, and a more constant solution than a 
federation according to many Turkish Cypriots. They indicate that the “YES” vote of 
the Turkish Cypriots for the UN Plan came mostly because of the Turkish Cypriot 
annoyance with their long economic and social isolation and not having the political 
recognition.281  The UN Secretary-General has himself declared this in his Report: 
“the benefits of European Union membership were an important factor …”282 
After it was understood that the political and economic restrictions will not be 
completely lifted, the Turkish side started to look more flexible to new initiatives 
about the solution of the Cyprus problem because it became obvious that the 
promises of the international community, especially the EU and the US, about the 
lifting of the restrictions were only in words, not in action. Thus Turkish officials 
started to give positive signs about the reconsideration of new initiatives for the 
solution of the Cyprus problem.283 Meanwhile, by some changes in American 
administration, Condolliza Rice became the new Secretary of State and Cyprus 
                                                 
280 Clement H. Dodd. “Constitutional Features of the UN Plan for Cyprus and its Antecedents”, 
Turkish Studies, Vol.6, No.1, March 2005, p. 50  
281 ibid., pp. 50-51 
282 “The UN Secretary-General’s Report on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus,” 2 June 2004  
283 “Erdoğan: BM'nin Kıbrıs Planı Yeniden Gözden Geçirilebilir”, AP, 26 December 2004, 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/DISBASIN/dis.htm  
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problem was frozen for the US until April 2005.284 President’s special envoy for 
Cyprus, Weston, has been retired and another envoy has not been appointed. But 
American officials continue to pay attention to the issue. For example on 10 
February 2005 it was stated that the US would donate 30 million dollars to TRNC for 
relieving its economic difficulties.285 Moreover, on 17 February 2005, right before 
the elections in TRNC, a visit by a small group of American businessmen backed by 
the American administration was a small but welcome gesture by the US to keep its 
undertaking to relieve the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriots.286   
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
This thesis attempted to find continuity and change in US policy on the Cyprus 
question in chronological order. It examined determinants of US policy, and tried to 
find US role and influence in efforts to find a solution to the problem. 
As it was mentioned in the first chapter, the US policy on Cyprus during the Cold 
War years was based on four main aims: First, the political stability of the Republic 
of Cyprus should be reached. Therefore, Cyprus would act together with the other 
newly established states against communism. Second, the island should be 
economically developed and democratic to pursue pro-Western aims. Third, the US 
must be able to continue using its communication facilities in Cyprus. Lastly, the 
British bases should be used by any Western nation for any friendly Western aim.  
In 1950s and in the first years of 1960s the US pursued a relatively passive policy on 
Cyprus, and it left the problem to Britain. The important issue for it was the solution 
of the problem. Thus, it welcomed proclamation of the Cyprus Republic. But the US 
had to involve itself in the Cyprus question in 1964, after the first inter-communal 
clashes broke out on the island and Britain tried to solve the problem. At this point 
the US was against the internationalization of the problem, and did not want the UN 
to get involved. Since the Soviet Union was a member of the UN Security Council it 
could get involved in the problem. However, that was not possible and the issue was 
brought to the UN in 1964.  
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Another concern of the US in the Cold War period was to prevent a war between 
Turkey and Greece, since it would create weakness for NATO against the Soviet 
bloc, and an intervention to Cyprus would cause this. Therefore, the US tried every 
way to make these two countries not to start a war. The Johnson letter was the most 
important proof of this.  
At the beginning, the US supported the partition of the island between Turkey and 
Greece, as it was proposed in Acheson plan. But, this policy later changed, and the 
US started to defend bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on the island. Cyprus was 
strategically important for the US because it was important for the containment 
strategy. It was very close to the Suez channel and it controlled the Middle East.  
The Military coup in Cyprus in 1974 and Turkish intervention was another turning 
point for the Cyprus question and Turkish-American relations. Although it did not 
reach its aim, the arms embargo was another harsh decision against Turkey, after the 
Johnson letter.  
Cyprus was an important subject of politics in the US until 1980s. By the beginning 
of the Reagan administration it lost importance gradually. But the US had begun to 
take sides with the Greek Cypriots gradually after the 1974 Turkish intervention 
because Denktaş and the Turkish side were seen as the obstacle for solution, 
although it was Makarios, who, in 1960s and 1970s, had been considered as the one 
who raised difficulties to the solution efforts. This came to surface in almost all 
occasions after that. For example, the US warned all the Muslim states not to 
recognize TRNC, when it was proclaimed in 1983. Another example was seen in 
1986, when the Turkish side was pressurized and alienated although it had accepted 
the UN proposals whereas the Greek side rejected it.  
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The US has always recognized the Greek Cypriot side as the official government of 
Cyprus, after the UN Security Council Resolution-186 of 1964, although sometimes 
American officials declared that the Greek side did not represent Turkish Cypriots.  
Threat perceptions of the US changed with the end of the Cold War. The US came 
out as the only Super Power and thus, the containment strategy was no longer 
pertinent. But, the Middle East was gaining more importance as a center of crisis. 
Thus, Cyprus, with its strategic location, was still important for the US. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, by the end of the Cold War, the Cyprus question 
entered a new period. The EU entered the scene as a new actor. There were two 
opposite views on its influence upon the Cyprus problem. There were those who 
thought that the EU membership would have an accelerating and facilitating effect 
on the solution efforts for the Cyprus question. Conversely, there were those who 
claimed that EU membership would destabilize some characteristics of the Cyprus 
issue, and thus, would have a troublesome effect. After a small hesitating period, the 
US accepted the EU as an accelerating effect, and tried to use it to convince the sides 
for a solution.  
In the 1990s, the US thought that inter-communal negotiations should be continued 
without any preconditions. It also thought that bi-zonal and bi-communal federation 
was the only way to solve the Cyprus problem. Furthermore, the US criticized 
Turkish Cypriots due to their firmness on the recognition of their state and breaking 
off of the EU membership process of the Greek Cypriots before achieving a complete 
solution. Thus, it pressurized the Turkish side much more than it did the Greeks. 
American officials tried to find ways to prevent the outbreak of crises because of the 
Cyprus problem, since they knew that they would have to intervene in such an event, 
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which would result in more dangerous circumstances. Their main endeavor 
concentrated on pressurizing the Turkish side for a quick solution. But some crises 
such as Kardak (Imia) and S-300 ones occurred which hampered their efforts. It 
proved that relations between the two sides, as well as Turkey and Greece, were still 
not improved enough, and tension was still high. Especially the S-300 crisis had 
another important aspect, showing that the US was still considering Russia as a threat 
in the Mediterranean.  
All the solution efforts and initiatives of the US, as well as other actors of the 
international community did not bring about a result, and all negotiations failed for 
one reason or another until the Annan plan, which was the best hope for a solution 
for the US ever. The US was involved in the preparation of the Annan plan, and it 
supported it in every phase of the negotiations. The plan was the best chance ever for 
the solution of the question, and all the conditions were appropriate. It   evaluated 
that there had been a gathering of forces over the past years producing this chance for 
reaching a settlement. The US thought that the EU had a catalyst effect throughout 
negotiations of the Annan plan, because there was the aspiration of all Cypriots, 
Greek and Turkish, and Turkey to join the EU.  Moreover, Turkish Cypriot side’s 
decision in April 2003 to relax restrictions across the buffer zone improved the 
hopes. 
Referenda of the plan brought about new conditions and changed the minds of the 
US and other international actors. The US was disappointed by the results of the 
referendum in southern Cyprus and it agreed with UN Secretary General Annan that 
it characterized another missed opportunity to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. 
It was understood that the Greek side, not the Turks, was the obstacle for solution, 
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and northern Cyprus does not deserve all the embargos and restrictions with which it 
had to deal. The US started some initiatives to relieve the restrictions of Turkish 
Cypriots. But they were weak in character and nothing has come out until now, 
except some gestures.  
The US policy on Cyprus does not seem to change radically. It seems that the US 
may seek ways to restart negotiations, although the Greek Cypriot side does not want 
it. This may be achieved by way of relieving the restrictions and embargoes on 
TRNC gradually and allow some kind of recognition by some Muslim countries, 
forcing the Greek side, which is an EU member and gives signals that it wants a 
solution inside EU without other international actors, for new negotiations.   
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